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ABSTRACT
The need for increased modularity in Naval ship design
is approached by first of all considering and examining the
overall design in two different areas: the required effort and
trends in the design process and the evolution of the design
process itself.
The growth in design effort in terms of participation
and man hours and the trends in ship design such as increasing
size, powering, software, etc. are discussed in order to point
out the increasing complexity of Naval ships. The impacts of
these trends on the actual design process are then analyzed.
This is accomplished by briefly reviewing and comparing the
conventional, CF/CD and present design process and discussing
their advantages and disadvantages. Finally, the present design
approach is analyzed in order to point out some of the drawbacks
and impacts of the "Design to Cost" philosophy.
The ship is next looked upon as an investment and
procedures are analyzed to increase the Navy's return on this
investment over the ship's life cycle. Some of the major
problems facing the Navy today in ship acquisition are discussed
and in all cases the incorporation of modularity appears to be
the best solution to these problems and create the best ROI
over the life cycle.
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Finally the modularity state of the art is covered
and a methodology presented to aid the designer, and operator
in selecting a level of modularity that best meets his needs
under different design philosophies.
Thesis Supervisor: Ernst Frankel
Title: Professor of Ocean Engineering
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1 . Complexity and Trends of Naval Ship Design
1. 1 Complexity of Naval Ship Design
The unique characteristic of a naval ship design
process is determined by three items; 1) technical complexity,
2) long life, 3) high unit cost and small numbers. The
design of an extremely versatile, powerful weapons system
is a vastly complex process, and perhaps could be considered
an engineering marvel. The number of subsystems and
components comprising the ship system and the technical
complexity and precision involved in the integration of the
subsystems into a homogeneous system so that it performs its
designed missions effectively for a life time of 25 years
or longer is quite immense.
Few engineering tasks require more man hours and have
a higher degree of technical complexity and design effort
than a naval warship. For instance studies recently
conducted at MIT showed that a DLG required approximately
six times the design effort as that of a supertanker, ten
times that of a land based utility station power plant, and
about three times that of ,i major airport. These figures
were basically arrived at by using an arbitrary weighing
system on the? number of man hours, decision input, trade off
studies, and technical expertise required to produce the
design. Basically a warship is so much more sophisticated
because it must be an effective multi-mission, mobile weapon
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system operating in all oceans of the world. It must keep
pace with the enemy threat and the rate of change of
technology. It must have long endurance and be able to make
repairs underway without the assistance of outside activities
Finally it requires a large range of skills to operate and
probably has the highest life cycle cost of any other piece
of engineering.
i. 2 Trends of Naval Ship Design
Naval ship design has followed several definite trends
over the past half century and has seen obvious increases
in the amount of effort required for the design, the
complexity of the hardware, and the use of software in the
ship system.
1.2.1 Design Effort
First of all to produce a warship a closely knit
design team is required comprising wide ranging engineering
talent, experts in the operational area and the managers to
efficiently and effectively coordinate the above two
groups. It is this group of people upon which the
performance of modern naval ships depends.
The size of the design community and the number of
man hours spent in the design effort has escalated quite
sharply since 194 0. Figure 1 shows the number of man
days required to complete a contract design for seven
























What is evident is the newer designs requiring
increased design effort and the strikingly sharp escalation
in design effort for the DLGN 38. However, several points
should be made to clarify the graph. First of all the man
day effort is for contract design only or the preliminary
contract and detailed design in todays terminology, and
primarily involves the hull and machinery design. In addition
the contractor electronics design effort is excluded along
with the weapons system, although weapon/hull interface
was addressed. Also the three nuclear designs do not include
the propulsion design effort. Although this does not give
an absolute magnitude type picture, it does point out that
the effort required to produce naval ship designs has been
steadily increasing with time. Obviously to include all
facets of the design would merely mean scaling up the design
effort access by an appropriate factor. The amount of design
effort is considered a function of two items, 1) the
efficiency of the design process and 2) the complexity of
the design. Obviously an inefficient design team requires
more effort than one that is organized. The design team's
efficiency depends on the number of participants, the
frequency at which the community is exercised and how they
utilize the latest techniques.
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1 . 2 . 2 Technical Complexity
The second trend in naval ships is in the area of
technical complexity which is probably the reason for the
escalation in design effort. The more complex a system is
the more design effort required. In any event what this
means is that the hardware such as payload/weapons systems,
propulsion, auxiliary and hull subsystems are much more
sophisticated. An indication of this fact would be the
increasing vessel displacements for a given type ship over
the past half century, (Figure 2). The increased displacement
results largely from the increased weapons, payload, and
manning requirements which in turn impacts the propulsion
and auxilliary equipment sub-system, Figures 3,4,5.
There are several points to be brought out in
Figure 2. First of all the new DD 963 presently under
construction approachs the same size as WWII light cruisers.
The present day single screw "DE" is larger than the twin
screw WWI destroyers, and todays nuclear powered frigates
should be considered cruisers. The other illustrations
merely support the fact of increasing ship displacement
with time.
The increased installed horsepower and complexity
is a result of the increased ship displacement. The
electrical and air conditioning requirements are increased
due to increased manning, and electronics subsystems,



































1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1910 1960 1970 1980
YEAR LAUNCHED
FIGURE 3 Growth of Electrical Power (8)
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
YEAR LAUNCHED
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require greater power and cooling capacities. By nearly
every measure it is evident that not only are today's ships
more powerful but they also contain an ever increasing
number of subsystems and components which equals greater
complexity .
The reason for the increased complexity is easily
traced to the increased performance requirements requested
by the operators. Todays ships are required to have increased
endurance, availability, automation, habitability, shock
resistance, quicker response to enemy threat and reduced
noise emission. In the area of response time WWII destroyers
were designed for 25 minutes, whereas todays vessels can
meet enemy threats in one to two minutes. Our vessel
reaction time must keep pace with that of the enemies,
therefore, the enemies increased capabilities has been a
major driving force on our own ship design.
With the shift to the all volunteer service, ship
board habitability has to be attractive and comfortable.
As a result today's ships have twice the living area per
man as compared to WWII designs, Figure 7. Obviously
there has been a shift in design philosophy here.
1.2.3 Miscellaneous Trends
Finally the trend in software associated with the
ship design process has seen a steady increase since WWII
























FIGURE 6 Growth in Size of Electronics Shoppinq List as an Indicator


















FIGURE 7 Habitability Trend ( 26 )
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of documentation required in performing all the trade off
studies and because of the more complicated design of the
hardware. Figure 8 depicts the increased number of
drawings in keeping pace with our more complex designs.
In addition the emphasis on reliability, maintainability
and availability, IIS, human engineering and safety
previously taken for granted has significantly increased
in todays priorities of design philosophy thus adding to
the software package and documentation.
In recent years greater industry participation has
occurred in the design effort in contrast to the previous
"in house" effort. Also the acquisition process involves
firm fixed price contracts. Therefore design results
have to be transmitted formally between industry and the
buyer and the various aspects of the contract require
more detail even to the smallest items in order to
eliminate any ambiguity.
Documentation has also been increased because of the
change in project management and because of the increase
design effort in terms of people involved. Trade off
and cost effectiveness studies are being examined at higher
levels of management before major decisions are being made.
Finally computer software is requiring greater
effort in preparing the computer program performance









































FIGURE 8 Growth in Number of Contract/Contract Guidance





portions of the combat system components are employing digital
computers which of course must be programmed and integrated
into the entire system. This digitizing of the combat
system amplifies the documentation magnitude.
The graphs that follow are provided to further
demonstrate that the design effort and complexity is forever
increasing. However several points should be brought out.
Destroyer size has been increasing over the past two decades
until the "design to cost" PF and DD ABGIS. Although
size has been increasing installed shaft horsepower has not
kept pace, therefore a decreasing speed trend results for
the DD-DLG-DLGN class. This trend may also be explained
by the gradual increase of importance of acquisition cost
habitability, and life cycle cost in the design and less
importance being placed on performance without regard to
acquisition cost.
1. 3 Introduction
These trends in ship design have been pretty much the
result of a necessity rather than a desire. Because of
the increase enemy threat and increased requirements of ship
design it is necessary to incorporate a greater effort,
more people, more documentation, more computer software
and more drawings. Unfortunately, all these increases
make a more expensive ship and a longer design period.
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Today especially with defense budget cutbacks, out ragious
inflation and very fast pace of technology it appears
that the ship design trend is leading in the wrong
direction. The truth is that these are real life situations
facing eh Navy. The combined effect of a long design
process and high rate of obsolesence makes for a very short
useful life for new ships before a Modernization and Conversion
(M&C) is needed. The problem is further compounded because
the Navy loses alot of ship availability when ships undergo
early M&C. In addition the shortage of sea going personnel
and high manning costs faces the designer to go to more
automated devices. The final result is that the Navy needs
to design and build more ships with greater availability
with less money and with essential manning in mind.
In the following chapters the history of the design
process is outlined and the philosophies driving these
processes are analyzed. Emphasis is placed on the present
design approach which follows the Design to Cost philosophy
and then comments are made on its drawbacks. The final
two chapters suggests a design approach to alleviate
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2 . Ship Acquisition Policies and Practices
. 1 Outline of Basic Ship Design
The naval warship design process over the past
/2 century has evolved into a highly sophisticated process
ronsisting of a wide spectrum of talent in the design
ommunity, thousands of man days and over ten years until
;he first ship's keel is laid. However during this period
:here have been some significant changes in the Navy's
approach, organization and philosophy towards the
.aborious design process. A review of past and present
practices will be presented in order to show the magnitude
Df the effort and to point out the Navy's changing
attitude.
First of all a ship's life cycle may be broken down
into well defined steps with the first being the Conceptual
Design Phase. This phase commences with the feasibility
study which, with the operators basic statement of need,
makes a wide ranging search of concepts. That is it
investigates all alternatives. Also in this phase the
design constraints and performance requirements are
established based on the owner's statement of need. The
design requirements consist of a specification of the
operational and technical performance that the concept
must meet. In other words — what must it be able to do
and how should it do it? The design constraints are
parameters which must be met or not exceeded. Emphasis
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zhe conceptual design phase and a duration of 10-12 months.
The decision to continue to the next phase of the
design is made in-house and is based on the answers of
some fundamental questions: 1) are the performance
requirements firm? 2) has the size and cost been established?
3) do we have the best concept? 4) are the technical risks
manageable?
If the design community feels confident about the
answers to the above and after all supporting documentation
has been completed and the decision to go on is made, the
preliminary design phase is commenced.
The preliminary design phase mainly concerns itself
with the identification of all the technical interfaces
associated with the ship's sub-systems. All trade of
decisions are made on the component level which is based on
a design criteria established at the beginning of this phase.
In addition a complete engineering description of an
integrated ship system must be achieved such that the basic
ship size and definition will not change during contract
design. Also a functional definition of integrated sub-
systems selected for optimization of tctal ship performance
and cost must be achieved. As mentioned previously a final




The whole effort in this phase begins with one concept
ind completes the engineering decision of the design which
s under taken by 80-90 engineers in-house and in the
zechnical community with a duration of 10-12 months.
Once again a functional baseline is drawn up which
Includes documented trade-offs and the top level specifications.
\ decision is again thrown up at this point on whether to
commit more money and push the design on into the contract
design phase or drop the project as it stand. This decision is, of
course, made by the secretary of defense.
The contract design is the last big push to the
finished product. Once this stage has been entered then
chances are good that the project will be carried out to
the construction phase. This effort consists of approximately
100-300 engineers and 12 months duration in which the fine
details of the design are worked out so that industry can
make a class A estimate. Finally a contract is awarded
and land based test sites for various sub systems are set up.
Once a builder has been chosen the design effort
essentially shifts from in house to out of house so that
working fabrication and construction drawings can be worked
up. This is primarily done by the lead ship builder.
With this design process in mind the phases of a

















a. Test and Evaluation
b. Logisties Support
i. i.e. Train Crew















2. 2 Conventional Approach
The design process however has changed significantly
in the past 4 years and in fact the above sketch of a
ship design process is representative more of that of the
pre 1960 period which is known as the conventional
acquisition process. The various phases and the decisions
and design effort have changed little since then however
the basic characteristics such as who actually does the work
(i.e. in house or out of house) and the cost consciousness
has changed greatly.
For instance the conventional process as previously
outlined consisted of the concept, preliminary, contract
and detail design. The majority of the effort was done
within the Navy (in house) on a non-regorous level with
little documentation and design control being kept. Costs
were of secondary importance and in fact relatively
unconstrained whereas the performance was optimized. In
addition, multiple ship yards were involved in the contract.
As a result of the non regorous approach and performance
optimized philosophy the whole process was pretty much
characterized by cost overruns, schedule overruns, and
lacking performance, (Figure 13).
2.3 CF/CD
Obviously the conventional design approach was
inadequate to economically and efficiently fulfill the
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leeds of the Navy in designing ships and a new approach was
needed. In the mid to late 60's a major shift in participation
occurred from essentially in house to out of house. The
rational behind this move was that significant costs
savings could be realized in the design process if
advantage were taken of the profit motive incentive of
industry and have strictly an "out of house" design. The
profit motivation associated with a multi-ship contract is
that of improving labor efficiency. Previously in the
conventional process not enough time and only about 1-2%
of the acquisition cost was spent in the design phase.
In addition there was a shift in the philosophy of the
balance between cost and performance in which life cycle cost
was emphasized and cost effectiveness optimized.
Consequently much more extensive design, increased rigor
and systems engineering and documentation was emphasized
in this new process.
More specifically the Navy would develop the concept
formulation in which the performance criteria and requirements
were established and would then selicit from industry
contract submittals. Based upon the Navy's specifications
industry would draw up a contract design and production
plan more commonly referred to as the contract definition.
Out of a half dozen designs the Navy would select the "best"
and award a contract for construction of the entire package
at a fixed price.
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Once again however as in the conventional process
serious problems existed with the CF/CD process because it was
too risky. More specifically there was just not enough
control over industry by the government with so much
"out of house" design. Also and more important the entire
acguisition process was stretched out to 10-15 years and
consequently had severe problems in technology changes and
obsolescence. As an example the DD1052 class program which
began in the mid 60' s experienced modernizations and
conversions on the vessels built at the beginning of the
program before the keels of the last ten were even laid.
This was due to the extremely lengthy design and
construction process of the CF/CD phase.
One thing that stands out as probably the most
important aspect of this process is the recognition of the
ship's life cycle cost. Previously with performance
optimization design life cycle cost was a low priority
item. However with the shift towards more expensive payload
and platform systems, higher maintenance and operational
costs, it was obvious that since acquisition cost only
amounted to about 25% of the life cycle cost that much
more attention was needed in the later cost rather than
the former. This was basically accomplished by performing
a life cycle cost effectiveness study on the vessel's
sub-systems as an aid in the trade off decisions. The life
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^ycle costs would be reduced as a result of the expensive
analyses under taken during the contract definition
process and the introduction of series production.
Furthermore, related costs such as training and repair
part support, would be lowered by ship standardization.
Such items considered were reduced manning through
automation, decreased repair, modernization time and
maintenance costs, test and evaluation of sub-systems
prior to installation, crew training, spare part systems,
and RMA analysis. In essense it was obvious to the Navy
that since a majority of its budget went to keeping its
ships operational rather than building new ones; a large
savings could be realized in optimizing life cycle sub
system costs during the design phase, (Figure 13).
2 . 4 Present Approach
The CF/CD approach was deemed unsuccessful for the
acquisition of naval ships and other major weapons systems
and replaced by a new approach more commonly referred to as
the "present" approach which incorporates several of the
strong points of the previous two design schemes and also
introduces several new concepts. The present approach
incorporates the in-house design effort and multiple ship
building of the conventional scheme with the industry
participation (out of house) , rigor of the systems
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angineering, documentation, and cost effectiveness studies
Df the CF/CD scheme. However the "new" concept perhaps
has the largest impact on the entire design process and
that is what is known as "Design to Cost". The objective
Df his procurement scheme was to complete in little more
than two years, all feasibility studies, a preliminary
design and contract design; solicitation and receipt of
"lead" ship proposals; all necessary contractor evaluation;
"lead" ship negotiation; and contract award. Additional
factors which contributed to the need for a new approach
to ship acquisition were that Total Package Procurement
in the CF/CD approach was experiencing difficulties in the
Air Forces C-5 and the Navy's LHA. The conventional
approach saw problems in frequently misunderstood or
allegedly vague or impossible to meet specifications by
the shipbuilders in addition to the lack of substantial
time between "lead" and "follow ships and the low
confidence in the firm fixed price" established at the time
of the contract. Therefore the Design to Cost approach
pushed for a strong "lead ship" approach by insisting that
the time be extended between the manual "lead" and "follow"
ship contract award. In this way construction problems
could be exposed and rectified early and eliminated from
"follow" ships. This construction approach is called
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Late in 1970 Admiral E. R. Zumalt, Chief of Naval
Operations, that directed a study commence for a new ocean
escort (the Patrol Frigate) to replace the aging WWII
destroyers. Because of the large numbers required in a
short time frame (by 1980) , the total cost of the program
had to be kept within reasonable bounds, and would
therefore have limited capability but complementing
existing ships of greater capability. More specifically
the CNO established an average "follow" ship acquisition
cost and a full load displacement as contraints not to be
violated. The design was to proceed in accordance with the
characteristics and missions, but capability was to be
"traded off" if it appeared that either of these constraints
would be exceeded. In effect these constraints required
the development and implementation of an entirely new
philosophy of Naval ship design.
The ship designer needed to have a design philosophy
to guide him in making the trade offs and compromises
which dominated the design process. Two issues which required
guidance involve the relative importance of performance
and cost and the selection of which cost to be utilized
in the design trade offs. For the DF program the following
guidance was established, (23), (24), (25).
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1. Performance/Cost Trade Off
"There must be a willingness to trade off desired
oerformance to achieve the cost goals while assuring that
a viable weapon system design is obtained".
"A design to cost program should be implemented which
prevents funds being spent beyond the point where costs
rise rapidly for small increments of increased performance
reliability. Although the Design to Cost concept does
require cost, schedule, and performance trade offs,
minimum essential performance requirements must not be
sacrificed"
.
2. Acquisition vs. Life Cycle Cost
"Unit production test must become a primary design
parameter. But this emphasis should not be construed to
imply that the unit cost is the sole driving consideration
in systems acquisition. Acquisition costs reductions must
not be achieved at the expense of increased ownership
costs"
.
"DTC is not a license to trade off operating and
support costs for reduced acquisition cost"
.
The objective of the Design to Cost concept is to
hold down the acquisition cost of weapons systems. It's
concept was first established as a formal policy in DOD
directive 5000.1 in 1971 as follows:
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"Cost parameters shall be established which consider
:he cost of a acquisition and ownership; discrete cost
element (e.g. unit production cost, operating and support
:ost) shall be translated into "design to" requirements"
.
This guideline is directed to increase the cost
consciousness of ship designers and acquisition managers
and thus hold down the cost of ships. However, the problem
remains of determining the fine distinction between mini-
num essential performance requirements and excessive
performance capabilities. In addition the guidance implies
that the designer must achieve a balance between acquisition
and life cycle cost although it does nto specify which
has priority. However, there is little doubt that the
immediate visibility of specifying a constraint on unit
production cost and the reality that initial budget
requirements are established for acquisition cost will
result in ship acquisition cost receiving the greatest
attention. Thus, Design to Cost is an attempt to hold
down the unit acquisition cost of ships so that the Navy can
afford to buy the number of ships required to maintain the
required fleet levels. This concept seems to make sense
however another approach to achieve the same end exists but by
almost opposite means. That is to build a more expensive ship
with a design philosophy of increased reliability, increased
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availability and increased maintainability thus shifting
savings in Life Cycle Costs into new construction. This
concept will be pursued latter in depth.
2 . 5 The Impacts of Design Cost
The PF design proceeded under three mandatory
constraints; cost, displacement and manning. The cost
constraint required that the entire ship system be designed
to perform a specific mission that augmented existing
designs and just well enough so that the system was cost
optimized rather than performance optimized within the
given mission requirements. The cost reduction could have
been brought about by one or all of the following means:
1. Reduced performance (cost = f (performance)
.
2. Take advantage of technology such as
smaller lightweight components which results
in low ship impact subsystems.
3. Improved management and rigorous design
discipline to produce a tight design.
The constraint on displacement required close scrutiny
of the ship's hardware needs and still meet the desired
performance. This was established because it was easier
to monitor weight rather than cost on a day by day basis.
Therefore a sophisticated weight control system was necessary
in order to properly allocate and budget weight between
the various sub systems and equipment. Finally the manning
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onstraint required that manning be reduced through auto-
mation and shore site repair of various components. Reduced
tanning it was felt would reduce ship size and life cycle
;ost since approximately 50% of life cycle cost is operational
expenses. The reduction in ship manning levels was forced
>y rising manpower costs, decreased defense appropriations
tnd decreased availability of personnel. The rising share
)f the total Navy budget for personnel alone limited funds
ivailable for Fleet modernization and new ships acquisition
>rograms. These increased manpower costs compounded
he situation especially in relation to decreasing defense
ippropriations. The projected decreases, when considered
7ith increased manpower costs, had the effect of doubly
•educing budgets for Fleet operation, maintenance and
modernization. While total military personnel have been
educed by about 1.2 million since 1968, military payroll
md other personnel costs have gone up by close to $5 billion
luring this period. In a different perspective, fifty
six cents of every defense dollar spent in FY 73 was for
payroll and other personnel related costs as compared to
:orty two cents in 1968. Cost however was not the sole
eason for instituting the manpower constraint in the PF
lesign. An overall reduction and severe limitation in
ivailable manpower for sea duty has been projected due to
:he trend toward the all volunteer Navy. Recruitment and
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retention problems are persisting in the face of high pay
scales and accommodations to civilian life styles. For
instance an extension of shore tours for career personnel
has the effect of reducing the numbers of personnel
available for sea duty. Therefore every aspect of the
manpower problem dictates a minimum level of shipboard
manning in every new ship the Navy procures.
Although the reduced manning concept was a major
constraint and because of its stingency very innovative
maintenance strategies were designed into the integrated
logistics support for the PF. Development of such an
approach began with structuring the operational profile
that depicted how the ship would be deployed and utilized
at sea. This profile in turn was used to develop the
PF maintenance concept which basically consists of off
ship maintenance facilities and plug in type modules.
The policy of scheduling of component replacement
before failure and off-ship repair of equipment is intended
to reduce the maintenance work load of shipboard personnel.
The concept is mainly directed towards electromechanical
equipments which dictates the need for rotatable pools.
These consist of an inventory of spare equipments and
components used to replace ship-installed units which have
failed or are need of repair. Units that have failed are
removed, refurbished and placed in inventory. For smooth
and successful operation the concept also requires that
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he design provide accessibility for equipment removal and
replacement to a far greater degree than has been required
or previous ship designs.
The second portion of the reduced maintenance concept
:onsistes of the replacement after failure of equipment
nodules and "off-ship" repair of inoperative modules.
This strategy is similar to the first, except that the
nodules for replacement would be stocked aboard ship as an
integral part of shipboard space allowances. This applies
nostly to the electronic equipments.
Finally in order to achieve greater than normal
at sea utilization the maintenance concept also calls
for the elimination of regular overhauls and replaced with
Entermmediate Maintenance Availabilities (INTMAV) at
approximately six month intervals and Restricted
Availabilities (RAV) at approximately two year intervals
In lieu of the 36 to 39 month interval for regular overhauls,
This "progressive overhaul" is intended to reduce the off
line time of the PF. In addition the regular cycle for ship
Tiodernization was eliminated and replaced with the military
Improvement Plan which calls for installing SHIPALT and
DRDALT packages during INTMAV and RAV. Obviously combining
all three constraints was quite difficult because all three
tend to drive the design in opposite directions. For
instance increased automation reduces manning but increases
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'eight and cost, decreased weight through lighter materials
ncreases cost, etc.
Although the PF is the only "Design to Cost" vessel
:hat has been carried through to contract and construction
:here are some striking observations and comparisons to be
aade in relation to non DTC ships.
To begin with the FFG-7 (PF) is the only single screw
jas turbine powered ship which means high HP/wt. ratio. It
carries a manning level of 181, a significant reduction
Dver past designs, in fact a 30% lower manning level ratio.
From a weight allocation standpoint the FFG-7 shows
marked differences in payload weight fraction with about a
20% decrease from past designs. This is primarily due
however to low weight density payload items and not a
significant reduction in payload carrying capabilities over
past designs. Other weight groups show no significant
differences.
The FFG-7 carries comparable payload volume however
there is about 15% less space allocated to personnel.
This can be attributed to the reduced manning levels, however
becuase of the increased importance on habitability the
space-man ratio has increased. The decreased living
space is perhaps offset by the increased allocation to




The FFG-7 has actually more internal volume than its
iredecessor, the 1052 class, but displacing 500 tons less.
his lower ship density is due to the previously mentioned
terns of high HP/wt ratio, increased habitability standards,
.ow density payload, and more access space. In essence the
TG-7 is larger but lighter than any of its predecessors.
From a military mission standpoint the FFG-7 cannot
>e considered to be a highly versatile multi-mission
/arship, however, it can be considered to be a significant
iddition to and an increase in escort and sea control
:apability of the fleet system. This is how the FFG-7 was
lesigned under the DTC concept. It is therefore difficult
:o compare its military effectiveness against previous
lesigns because of the wide range of capabilities required
for multi-mission warships.
One item of performance that is strikingly different
and blatantly obvious is the ship's ability to "support" its
military mission and mobility capabilities. This
characteristic is focused in the RMA of the ship system.
A. ships operability is vitally important; in fact, a ship
which pocesses performance capability and mobility but
unable to be crew maintained is not an effective design.
The FFG-7 shows high risk in this area of support
due to its low manning levels and lack of future growth
capability. With its manning cut by 70 men over the
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)D 1052 the question arises whether the FFG-7 can accomplish
facilities maintenance such as cleaning and preservation
within Navy PMS standards. Certainly one could not expect
;o believe that an FFG-7 would require less house cleaning,
tainting, and hull maintenance or have in general less
vear and tare than any other ship. From fleet experience,
he most demanding manning situation is most often peacetime
import and not wartime condition I or III at sea.
The lack of future growth capability is reflected in
zhe cost cutting measures of reduced or elimination of
ervice life margins. The FFG-7 does not have as much
lexibility to accommodate new systems when it comes time
zo modernize the ship. This "tightness" is contrary to
zhe modularity design philosophy in which subsystem
flexibility is emphasized in return for speedier and easier
nodernization, improved military effectiveness and reduced
Life cycle costs. The FFG-7 comes closer to the Naval
Architects limits than has been found prudent in the past.
It is the contention of this thesis that the DTC
philosophy in holding down ship acquisition cost has
seriously impared any future growth capability which
represents a reduction in not only the ship's present
performance capability but also its future capabilities.
Perhaps a warship's greatest threat is obsolescence which
is brought about by changing technology, state of the art,
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nd enemy threat. A warship must be designed and built so
hat it can keep pace with technology and incorporate the
atest and more sophisticated payload items and other
omponents quickly and inexpensively. Otherwise the ship
ill probably cost more over the life cycle.
"The fundamental question which must be asked is
/hether this pressure imposed by this DTC philosophy
esulted in a tighter and thus more efficient design which
an still carry out the required mission or whether the
obsession with reducing ship size and cost resulted in a
ship lacking in basic capability", (9).
It seems ironic that the advanced concept of reduced
3n board maintenance and off-ship repair of inoperative
nodules was brought about by a severe limitina constraint
Dn the design. The PF design shows great strides in the
iirection of modularity and measured availability, however,
it is this authors contention that the latter case in the
above observation exists. The PF appears to be lacking
in basic capability because of the philosophy of "Design
to Cost". In order to explore the full potential, benefits
and flexibility of a module design
, the design philosophy





3 . Design Considerations for Increasing the Navy's
Return on Investment
. 1 Introduction
The fundamental question in Naval ship design at this
pint is whether limited capabilities and flexibility be the
ay point with acquisition cost receiving the highest priority
id life cycle costs secondary or whether a slightly more
•jcpensive ship be designed with increased capability but with
ie sole aim of reducing the overall costs of keeping the ship
urrent and afloat. It appears that the most sensible means
ould be the latter, however, as the saying goes, "it's easier
aid than done". It is similar to the situation of a car buyer
rying to decide between an inexpensive compact or a luxurious
ercedes Benz. In the one case the purchase is relatively cheap
oth in price and perhaps quality. In the order, if the buyer
an afford to make the initial plunge then he can probably be
ssured of decreased maintenance and operational costs, a longer
ife and in the long run a less expensive investment,
overnment investment for items of defense are somewhat more
omplicated by the billions of dollars and the large number of
terns involved in the acquisition process. The basic concept,
lowever, is still valid.
5. 2 Reduced Life Cycle Cost Through Reduced Acquisition Cost
Essentially there are five components which add to
:he total cost of acquiring and operating a naval ship for
i lifetime of 25-30 years. These include design, acquisition,
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laintenance, modernization, and operation (Figure 14)
.
Obviously there are many ways and combinations of
having various components in order to reduce the life cycle
ost. However, one must be cautioned to the pitfall of
elieving that reduced expenditure in certain areas naturally
ranslates into decreased ownership costs. For instance,
he design effort in terms of length and participation could
e reduced, however, if the design is not tight then the
ntire package could be lacking in performance and may not
ven meet the design requirements. The entire design is
herefore useless.
One means is by concentrating in the acquisition area
hich in essence is what the present "Design to Cost"
hilosophy does. This makes sense for two reasons. One is
hat this is the second largest "piece of the pie" and
avings in this area are probably more than those possible in
he design area. The other reason is that because of the
iscount factor a dollar received today is worth more than
ne received at a later date. Therefore, savings realized
arly in the acquisition process are worth more than an
qual savings realized in the operational area of the
ship's life at 10-15 years of age. However, if too heavy an
ixe is used in making an austere vessel then most likely




In Chapter 2 it was brought out that the PF was
esigned with an acquisition cost, displacement and
lanning constraint, and austerity being the key. The final
•roduct was a vessel whose performance capabilities were
ot overly impressive by itself but filled an important
ap in the "fleet system" by augmenting or supplementing
he planned and existing fleet of escort ships. The PF
ras intended to operate with other escorts and if these
existing escorts possessed an adequate capability in a
:ertain area then it was felt that the PF need not
luplicate it. This seems to be sound philosophy however
me must look at the impacts of this philosophy before
)assing judgement. As brought out in Chapter 2
he PF showed high risk in the area of support due to its
ow manning levels and lack of future growth capabilities.
?he first item may be manageable but the later would
ippear not to be. Because a Naval ship is exposed to
irequant technology changes and a high rate of obsolescence
or items of payload, whose is to say that the PF will be
ible to accommodate these future changes during modernization
periods if it has no future growth margin. If it is unable
:o do so then it can no longer supplement the fleet system and
is therefore obsolite. Another possibility is that in order
tc observe a no growth margin, manufacturers may be required
to design super compact and light payload sub systems and
:omponents that may be installed in future modernizations.
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his of course means increase modernization costs which
robably translates into increased ownership costs.
.
3 Reduced LCC Through Reduced Operation Costs
The second area where savings exist would be during the
perational phase of a ship's lifetime which would include
odernizations, maintenance and operationa. Because the
perational portion is the largest, common sense says that this
s where the greatest savings may be realized. Perhaps the
wo major factors in this area are manning and fuel with
anning having a far greater impact. In fact, the cost of man
ower is an astonishing sizeable chunk of the overall cost
hich is evident in Figure 15.
Obviously if an essentially manned ship can be designed
hrough the use of automated subsystems and monitoring devices
hen tremendous cuts in manning costs can be made. This is
'hat the PF attempted to do in imposing the manning constraint.
[owever, as previously mentioned in Chapter 2 extensive use of
he manning reducing devices can increase acquisition cost and
lisplacement to the point where life cycle costs are increased.
"herefore, there is a trade off between the reduction in manning
:osts through automation and an increased acquisition cost. In
addition a decrease in manning requires that more shore based
facilities and assistance be available in order to perform
required maintenance. This in turn requires that more components
oe of the "plug in, plug out" type. Depending on the extent to
























3. 4 Methods to Increase the Quality and Quantity of Ships
Certainly the cliche' "design is a trade off" holds
for this situation in which several philosophies exist and
seem to conflict. However, the "Design to Life Cycle" seems
to make more sense when the Navy's ship acquisition is viewed
as an investment and not merely as just another defense
purchase. The investment must not be confused with that of
the private sector, however, because the returns are
significantly different. In the private sector investments
are made with the idea of reaping monitary returns
sometime in the future whereas in the public sector most
returns are of a non-monitary nature that are non
measurable. For instance a warship is intended to effectively
carry out designed missions and performance capabilities
in the line of national defense for a 25-30 year period.
No matter which sector the investment is made the intent
for both is to maximize its returns.
The investment of government expenditure in
national defense consists of several areas which include new
construction (SCN) weapon procurement (WN) other
procurement, (OPN) , R&D and T & E, and operation and
maintenance. The return is measured by the military
strength not only in terms of quality but also quantity.
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Warship quality can be thought of as a combination of
operational effectiveness or capability and operational
availability which is a function of the system's mean time
between failure (MTBF) (e.g. maintainability) and mean time to
repair or downtime (MTTR)
.
Availability = MTBF/MTBF + MTTR
Capability can be further broken down into but not
limited to the obvious items such as fire power, reaction
time, payload carrying capability, etc. However, the
element of time is also a function of any return and this
perhaps has the largest impact on a ship's future capability.
The factor of time must therefore be added to the weapon's
value assessment. Capability is relative to that of a
potential adversary and over the course of time an adversary
may develop newer better weapons and/or develop weapon
systems which are sufficiently different to negate
existing defensive measures.
The Navy's job has always been the indespensable
role of national defense but in recent years the Navy has
been plagued by the inability of performing its missions.
This is caused by the fact that the level of threat from
foreign powers has steadily increased whereas the levels
of U.S. defense has dropped tc an all time low. This is
caused by the fact that a slight shift has occurred in
recent years away from surface combatant and ocean escort
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icquisition to ballistic missile submarines as a sea based
strategic deterrent weapon system. A consequent shift occurred
Ln SCN budget to submarines away from surface ship construction,
[n addition because of the rapid rate of inflation the SCN
midget has remained constant in terms of real dollars even
:hough the budget has increased in terms of nominal dollars,
tfhat this all leads up to is that the Navy has not been able
:o build the number of ships it would like to with the
performance capabilities it needs.
"Considering the ever increasing sophistication of
lardware and software required to counter today's threats
Bffectively, the gap between what is needed and what is
available continues to widen."
The problem, however, continues to get worse. Every
ne today is aware of the attacks of congress and the
public on the defense department to trim its budget and cut
Dtu the frills and unnecessary expenditures. In addition,
vith the removal of US. involvement in S.E. Asia, the
emphasis on government expenditure has shifted from defense
:o more vital areas of natural concern. Therefore, it
appears that an increased SCN budge is unlikely and because
today's weapon system are becoming outrageously expensive
just to meet basic performance criteria it appears




or defense to more defense for the dollar. In doing so
he Navy's return on the quality and quantity of combatant
hips within the constraints of an essentially fixed overall
udget is maximized.
With the identification of the two major elements, of ROI
hip quality and quantity, the next step is to suggest
eans by which they can be achieved. If a constant budget
or the Navy is assumed then the only feasible means of
ncreasing ship quantity is by either identifying cost
aving measures and reallocating them to the budget elements
reviously listed or by increasing the longevity of naval
hips. Because new construction (SCN) is only one among
ive elements in the Navy's total budget, it is the amount
f this budget which determines the number of new ships that
an be constructed. Therefore assuming a fixed budget the
eans available of providing more funds for new construction
s attained by the following means.
1. Shift funds to SCN from other Navy budget
categories by realizing savings in the other
categories previously mentioned.
2. Reduce the cost of modernization and conversion
to free more funds for new construction.
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3. Reduce the cost of new construction to
allow construction of mere ships - Design
to Cost.
4. Increase the ship platform longevity.
The second parameter (e.g. increased ship effectiveness)
s perhaps a little more difficult to quantify since it is
irectly a function of time. As previously mentioned a
hip's capability is measured relative to the rate of
echnology change and to the capabilities of a potential
nemy. A ship may be considered at the state of technology
t the time of iniation of development however it if does
ot undergo any modernizaticn during its lifetime so that it
smains at the state of technology then it experiences a
^clined military value over time. At some point, which is
ery difficult to pinpoint, the weapon system becomes obsolete.
Dwever what is clear is that the onset of obsolescence occurs
Dre rapidly with faster rates of technology change and as
Dre advanced technology is available to a potential
iversary. In fact, if one considers a weapon life span of
3-20 years and a development and production time of 5-10 years
lis leaves a useful life of 5-18 years before obsolescence,


















FIGURE 16 Military System Worth Curve
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Chapter 1 attempted to explain the amount of design
ffort participation, and length of time required however
ome additonal comments on development time are needed
n relation to military worth.
The problem that exists is that the highly formalized
cquisition process pushes the development cycle out to
bout 14 years in which the combat system is proven in the
irst seven years followed by the platform definition and
onstruction in the last seven years. Figure 17 is an
llustration of the current time frame of the present
cquisition process which includes design development, and
ervice life up to its first modernization. The point to
e made is that the lengthy acquisition cycle is caused
y the requirement that sufficient development be done in
he weapons suit so that reasonable accurate and well defined
arameters can be established in the form of "Top Level
equirements and Specifications" . This process however
s perhaps a little outdated since it stems from a time when
echnology was changing at a slower pace and system
ntegration wasn't such a difficult and time consumming
rocess. The result is that due to inflation and the
ncreased rate of threat and technology the platform
haracteristics have to be altered during the final years
f development which in turn causes a complex and costly





















































Dbsolescence rates between payload and platform results
in very costly and time consumming re-integration whenever
a modernization is done. With this in mind the series
development may be visualized in relation to the state of the
art in Figure 18.
Finally the series development of paylcad and platform
severely limits the useful life of weapon systems in comparison
to a threat that is continuously changing. Follow ships
tfill have an even shorter useful life than the leadship and
it's conceivable that large multi-year procurements may
result in the delivery of already obsolete ships. There are
perhaps three alternatives to the above and they are to build
short life ships and early disposal at the onset of
obsolescence, build a static ship system for a 25-30 year
Deriod or irake periodic changes to keep the subsystem
:urrent with technology and the state of the art. Obviously
:he first one is cost prohibitive and the second is
ridiculous which leaves the third as the only feasible
olution.
"In an era when one speaks of technology having an
Bver decreasing half-life, it is submitted that one cannot
afford the luxury of designing and building tightly
integrated ships. To do so will hasten their obsolescence






















FIGURE 18 Series Development in




The cause of the problem has been identified but
feasible solutions along the lines of alternative 3 above
(e.g. to increase the effectiveness of Naval ships) need to be
established. For instance, if one considers availability as
Dne measure of effectiveness then availability can be
increased by raising the obsolescence curve or by earlier
application of technology through the reduction of development
time. This can be accomplished in three ways; 1) by
increasing the absolute capability or performance of the
weapon system, 2) by accelerating the advancement of the state
}f the art through increased emphasis on R & D and T & E,
3) by more frequent modernization; at a reduced scope and by
Limiting the modernization to crucial system components with
:he shortest technolical life span rather than exchanging
entire systems.
The area under the Military Worth Decay Curve may
ilso be increased by reducing the development time thereby
Increasing operational effectiveness by means of accelerated
Implementation of new technology. In other words what needs
o be done is to cut down the time required for the series
levelopment and integration of the weapons payload and
Platform or if possible to pursue a parallel development.
A ship's availability is also a function of several
.terns over the course of its lifetime such as the number and
ength of modernizations and regular overhauls, which require
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approximately 20 months and 6 months respectively. Improving
the ship's availability implies reducing the amount of time
the ship is unable to perform or only partially able to
perform its intended mission. Figure 19 presents an
approximate availability scenario for a conbatant. With
four RDA and one M & C in a 25 lifetime then the best
availability that can be expected disregarding emergency
repair and yard availability is about 85%. Therefore in
Drder to improve availability and the ROI, four alternatives
axist:
1. Decrease the time required for modernization
and conversion.
2. Decrease the time for regular overhauls and
restricted availability.
3. Increase the component reliability
4. Increase component and system maintainability,
tfith this in mind it appears at this time that the means at
land to increase both the quality and quantity of ships,
:heir effectiveness and the overall ROI is the concept of





































































. Design for Change - The Modularity Concept
.1 Definition of Modularity
As outlined in the previous chapter there exists two
listinct yet interrelated problems of designing a ship so
:hat the platform is essentially uncoupled from the payload
md a ship design so that future conversion can be
.ccomplished with relative ease. The first problem may
tot be completely solvable because there are no simplistic
nswers to combatant ship platform and payload integration
•roblems or even to component or subsubsystem integration to
brm the combat subsystem or payload. The fairly new concept
if modularity however is a partial if not complete solution
;o this problem and is a definite solution to the problem
if accomplishing easy future conversions. Before showing
iow this can be accomplished the modular concept must be
Lefined, its present state of art presented and some of
:he concepts that have up to now been studied.
Not everyone has the same understanding of the meaning
>f modularity because the word basically lacks precision,
'he American Heritage Dictionary contains the following
irray of definitions: 1) a standard, 2) a uniform component
ised repeatedly in erection or construction and 3) a self
:ontained assembly of components that perform a specific




In ship design and construction one must not erroneously
hink of modularity as only containerization which is merely
narrow band of the overall concept. The broad band definition
o be kept in mind is the physical and/or functional grouping
f elements of a complex system into building blocks for the
urpose of 1) ease of construction, 2) ease of integration,
) ease of installation, 4) ease of removal and 5) ease of
nterchangeability. In ship design the work modularity has
-een used to identify anything from large, sometimes pre
utfitted segments of ship hulls to an assembly of several
ieces of equipment mounted on a common pallet, to throw
way circuit cards, to a subroutine of a computer software
ystem. In this study the word modular shall be defined as:
re-packaging of a collection of equipment (systems or
components ) for the purpose of their assembly and check out
rior to delivery to the ship for installation and removal
»f the package. The modular design as proposed by a Booz
Jlen (3) study is a system constructed of modules or unit
•ackaging scheme, usually having all major dimensions in
tccordance with a prescribed series of dimensions and which
ire capable of being easily formed or detached as an entity
rom other components, units or next higher assemblies.
(nder this broad intrepretation it appears that the term
applies to all procured and pre-assembled or nearly "ready
-o install" equipment packages such as gummounts, launchers
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and directors. However it is not limited to any specific
category of ship material i.e. hull, propulsion,
electrical, electronics payload.
4 . 2 Module Types
The above definitions provides a basic understanding
of the concept as used in this thesis however it is
necessary to establish some basic levels of modular design
in order to categorize various types of modules. The three
classes of modules that presently exist are construction,
large scale functional and small scale functional modules.
These are basically distinguished by both size and utility.
4.2.1 Construction Module
The construction module includes large scale, pre-
outfitted sections of a ship which are joined together to
form the total ship. This concept fits the modular
definition however detachment at a future time at the
module connections is not anticipated but still remains
possible. Piping system, ventilation systems, electrical
wiring and various forms of detail work may be completed
and checked prior to joining the modules. This technique
allows for construction of large sections of a ship and
a substantial portion of outfitting done while compartment
accessibility is still good. Later all the sections are
joined in a drydock or building platform. This technique
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Ls only limited by the lifting capacity of the yard equipment,
naterial available, fragility of the installed equipment,
pilferage and imagination. The net reduction in time spent
oy the ship at the building site in finishing work and in
tutfit after launch yields lower overall construction costs
and production time. This process is well suited for a
series production such as that undertaken by Litton in
instructing the LHA. Jumborized hull sections that have
Deen constructed and outfitted in assembly line fashion
are joined into a single ship unit. The intent of the
:onstruction module is solely to aid in the production
Dhase and not for future modification and maintenace. Few
ships have been designed with the intent and possibility
}f reopening in the future.
Construction modules reached large scale applications
luring WWII as "package construction" in order to reduce
the time for construction, conversion and repair. Some
specifics include the prefabrication of hull sections and
production line assembly of liberty ships and "jeep"
aircraft carriers; installation of blister envelope and
40 m gun sponsors on old battleships; and prefabrication
and installation of new bows on battle or storm damaged
destroyers and cruisers. Present day use in addition to
the LHA program include the installation of jumbo hull
sections an the Manhattan and Navy submarine construction;
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pre-outfitted hull sections in Japanese and Swedish ship
construction; tanker pre outfitted sections in the Brooklyn
Yard of Seatrain Shipbuilding; preassembled helicopter hanger
and mast structure for the 692 class destroyer FRAM;
preassembled deck hosues for Navy and Merchant Ship
construction.
The construction module shows great promise and
benefit to the shipbuilder in the way of reduced construction
time and costs which can be passed on in part to the operator
as a one time saving in the acquisition cost. However,
this module type has very little impact on the problem
of payload/platform uncoupling and ease of future conversions
In addition the subsystems in the construction modules
are generally highly integrated which requires the opening
of many subsystems during module separation to gain access
to one.
"Although past and current shipbuilding practices
employ extensive planning of the constriction program to
maximize the amount of off-hull assembly and test work, the
objectives of the packaging schemes are essentially oriented
to the reduction of cost and time required to construct
and test the ship and seldom are optimized to satisfy the




4.2.2 Large Scale Functional Module
The next level of module type is the large scale
functional module which are packaged units that perform a
major function and are as large as one or more ship
compartments. Such items as a missile launcher, magazine
handling equipment and fire control electronics may be
contained in a weapons module while a command and control
module may include CIC, radio room, electronic repair
shop, electronic component spaces stowage and conning
station. Basically this level can be thought of as a
mission module which when used in a series production
provides for rapid modernization and conversion assuming
the modules can be easily removed and replaced.
Large scale functional modules have been employed
in recent years in three categories; 1) the single location
integrated subsystem, 2) one or more compartments,
3) single location integrated systems. For instance the
contract proposal for the LHA included incorporation of
four interchangeable weapon modules. The 1960 DEG study
recommended a fully outfitted electronic compartment
carried in a pipe framework for checkout and testing
ashore prior to installation aboard ship in one crane lift.
Multiple compartment modules have been utilized in the
containerization of both organizational and intermediate
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maintenance functions and supply support for the SH3
aircraft on the USS WASP. Containerized avionic workshops
were installed aboard the USS Guam in order to analyize
the Sea Control Ship containerized AIMD design concept.
Similarly the USS America was outfitted with three
specialized equipment containers to support EA-6B aircraft.
4.2.3 Small Scale Functional
The final class of modules consists of the small scale
functional modules and has probably received greater
attention in recent years than the previous two types.
These modules are useful primarily in conducting maintenance
and repair and are generally small in relation to the size
of the ship. Such uses include printed circuit boards,
gas turbine hotsections and frequency changer sets. Small
scale modules seem to be best suited for high failure rate
standardized items where quick and easy removal and
replacement is necessary. Present uses include combatant
weapon and launcher systems such as the 5"/54 raped five
guns, MK 26 missile launcher, ASROC, Sea Sparrow and
Terrier MK10 missile system. These systems are installed
as a unit, connected to ships systems and finally checked
out. The FBM submarines utilizies a modular grouping of
the GMFCS MK 8 4 which can be installed in minimum time
withreduced on board testing. Finally the latest nuclear
powered surface ships have special superstructure design
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features which allows for easy vertical removal and
replacement of fuel cores and reactor plant equipment.
The building block may be considered as an
extension of the pre packaged module and the
small scale functional module and allows for the
enhancement of capability through the simple exchange,
addition or deletion of a module to the basic
configuration already installed. It allows for
modernization and conversion of the component level instead
of the system level, given that the modernization involves
simple additon or reduction to capability that already
exists.
The representative modular systems presently in
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In summarizing, modularity in the shipbuilding industry
has been used quite effectively since WWII by developing
construction modules of hull, deckhouse and specific
compartments with the effect of decreasing both the
shipbuilding cost and time. The Large Scale Functional
modules permit ease of checkout, installation, repair
and refit at reduced time and cost. The Small Scale
Functional items permit ease of repair and refit.
It should be obvious at this point that modularity
is more than just pre-packaged units or a pre-assembled
grouping of a number of related things in a common
container that are dropped on board a transport vehicle,
are easily moved about and are easily removed and replaced.
The fact is that this is only a small portion of the concept
and that full consideration must not only be given to the
module but also to the transporting platform and to the
interfaces between the two.
There appears to be extensive experience and
knowledge in the different modular groupings, however
the change in the methodology of ship design and
construction has been slow because the modular development
up this point has been more the result of necessity and
not of a new design approach.
Another contributing factor is the trend toward the
integration of shipborne systems particularly in the combat
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systems which makes it increasingly difficult to identify
subsystems which can be physically separated into individual
module. For instance many electronic and weapons systems
require auxiliary services such as A/C, fresh water,
hydraulic power and certainly electrical power. In
addition many of the ship's subsystems have no central
location but are scattered in parts within the ship for
reasons of operational need and efficient use of space.
This of course prevents a functionally coherent package.
Perhaps a better reason to explain the slow progress
towards large scale modularity is the lack of in depth
studies to date. Basically past attempts were too broad
and therefore unable to answer some of the specific
questions. Others addressed only specific cases which
included insufficient and nonconvincing generalizations.
There was insufficient effort in these studies in
analyzing the all important difference between technical
feasibility and economic feasibility. Finally studies
were done in the context of a specific ship system
development program, thereby tying the study group
into the overall ship concept development program schedule
wherein the necessary technical development was precluded
in time for that program, the program funds were




"It seems apparent that future warships will apply
as much of the modular philosophy as technology will
permit. A critical element in the wider use of these
nodular techniques in the Navy is a recognition of the
potential and then a movement to develop modularized
nission oriented payload." (6)
4 . 3 Reduced Acquisition and Life Cycle Costs
The basic question at this point is how does the
.-nodular concept alleviate the problem of an insufficient
number of surface ships. As mentioned in Chapter 4 this
an be accomplished by either increasing the budget for
new construction and build more new ships or by increasing
he availability of these ships presently in service or
a combination of both. The modularity concept can
increase the pool of funds for new ship construction by
shifting funds from one or several of the other budget
categories. It appears that the various features of the
modular conept could contribute to substantial savings
in the budget categories WPN, & MN and OPN. More
specifically the building block design and the standardized
component allows standardization for a broad range
of applications between ships of the same class and between
other classes. This allows for bulk and multiple





8-17% per category could be realized with a minimum
purchase of 5 shipsets. Because most new class
purchases are many times larger than this minimum the inter
class standardization should produce even greater savings.
Thus the building block or small scale functional and
standardized components in the combat system should
reduce required funds in the WPN category. OPN could
also be reduced if the approach were extended to mechanical
and electrical systems in the platform. Additional
savings could be expected in manning costs (0 & MN
expenditures) due to the reduced maintenance man hours
brought on by the improved system reliability and
maintainability. The increased R & M stems from the
ability to replace high failure modular components with
progressively improved components without otherwise
impacting the basic system. This approach is represented
by the present NAVELEX Standard Hardware Program.
The second means brought out in Chapter 3 to
increase the new construction fund is to decrease the cost
of modernization and conversions. Because of changing
threats and technology changes M & C will always be
necessary. To do otherwise would mean ships that are
well behind the state of the art and forced into early
retirement. The fact is however that since 1953 M & C
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osts have continued to comprise 20-25% of the SCN budget.
i closer examination of M & C performed on 15 different
ships breaks down the cost into the following: (6)
Category % of Basic M & C Construction
lull Modification 36 + 3.5
Ship Services Modification 32 + 3.5
Zombat System Rip-On and 28 + 4.8
Installation
The cost of changes to the platform, payload and their
interface were pretty much equal. Where the expense comes
in for most M & C is that major structural modifications
and changes to the arrangement of non-structural bulkheads
are necessary due to the lack of initial space and
arrangement provisions for weapons system changes. In
addition the refit involves replacement of one weapon
system with a completely new and different one; consequently
no components of the system being removed are common to
the replacement system. Very often the existing auxiliary
services do not have enough built in margin to handle the
increased demands brought on by the new system and therefore
have to be upgraded
.
It is this area where modularity perhaps has the
greatest impact since the concept is oriented towards
accommodating future changes in mission requirements —

-81-
"Design to Change". It offers reduced funding requirements
for M & C by utilizing modular combat systems, a platform
configured for ready installation and containment, access
and service connections and simple interfaces between
payload and platform, and thus allows more money for new
construction.
The third area of cost savings is through the use
of modular sections during the construction phase of ship
design. As previously brought out the pre-outfitted
hull assemblies in commercial ship building reduces
construction time and cost. This savings can be attributed
to five key features: 1) "ideal" working conditions with easy
accessability , 2) parallel assembly activities, 3) Test
and checkout accomplished in parallel with construction
and prior to installation, 4) learning curve effects from
pre assembly of many identical similar items, and 5) ease
of handling and installing fewer, pre assembled units.
The large scale pre packaging need not however be limited
to the construction phase. In fact, similar savings
and features could easily be extended to the development
of weapons and electronics. Simplified interfaces
through consolidation and elimination contribute to the
ability to parallel test and checkout prior to installation;
that is an essentially independent module. Parallel
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testing is also facilitated through such features as
service trunking, access routes, distributing centers.
These also allow for those GFE components and subsystems
with long lead time delivery to be installed later on in
the construction phase thus eliminating the governments
risk of contract delays due to late deliveries. To a large
extent the shipbuilder's schedule can be made independent
date of the delivery if items of payload and
any late changes in the makeup of the payload can be
nandled with the built in provisions. It even appears
feasible to have the weapons and or C3 subsystems assembled
and tested by the prime contractors, delivered to the ship
and installed after construction is complete. In spite
Df a possibility in increased internal volume the net
affect is reduced construction cost of new ships, in
addition to reduced construction time and a more rapid
influx of new ships into the fleet. Although reduced
construction costs seem feasible studies by Booz Allen
\pplied Research in 1968 show that the acquisition cost
Is actually increased. Depending on the amount of
nodularity employed in the design significant costs were
realized in the one time cost items of subsystem and
equipment development, detailed engineering, construction
md test facility equipment, crew training, ship materials
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nd equipment. For instance in the subsystem development
hase more design effort would be necessary if inter-
hangeability of dissimilar subsystems is contemplated,
lso if major emphasis is to be placed on lowering ship-
oard maintenance skills requirements and manpower reduction,
ignificant costs may be required for development of more
mall scale functional modules. Most of these cost
ncreases however are for one time costs which occur at
he start of a multiple construction project. If the
esign calls for a large number of vessels to be built
hen these costs can be spread out over the entire project
nd make the increased development costs appear insignificant
n any case more analysis is required to determine the
xact impact on acquisition cost.
. 4 Increased Operational Effectiveness
Perhaps an even greater impact of the modular
esign than on the construction and acquisition stage is
he ship's operational effectiveness. The improvement
n this area is achieved by five elements.
1. Reduced combat system development time.
2. Reduce ship platform development time.
3. Parallel development of platform and payload
4. Reduced modernization and conversion time.
5. Incremental, more frequent modernization
at the component level to reduce the
military worth decay rate.
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Previous chapters brought out the increase in
echnical complexity, design effort and cost involved in
eveloping today's advanced combat systems which is
ttributable in part to over-centralization. With the
eature of component standardization in the modular
esign, interface problems are simplified in addition to
ecentralization via direct functional mechanization,
tandardization also allows reapplication of proven
omponents that may be employed in the new system with little
Iditional development affort.
In a similar fashion the time required for platform
onstruction is reduced through the use of construction
Ddularity. The more efficient working environment,
He use of pre outfitted sections and the shift from a
isries type construction in a drydock to a parallel one
ci building platforms all adds up to faster ship
onstruction. As pointed out, these advantages are generally
lell recognized and most modern shipyards make extensive
ue of construction modularity.
The third aspect of increased operational effectiveness
i; an offshoot of the first two and is one of the biggest
aivantages of the modular design. The payload/platform
^ries development is presently a 12-14 year process.
viously a payload system that is considered state
the art at the beginning of the design is certainly
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:lose to obsolescence or in need of modernization in today's
:echnology pace soon after the first ship is delivered to
he fleet. The Military Worth Decay Curve illustrates the
ubstantial losses involved in the series development,
'his problem is further compounded in a large construction
•rogram extending over a period of 9-10 years. A ship's
reapon suit could become obsolete before a ship of the
:ame class, but later in the series, is delivered which
n most cases leads to modernization and conversion of
iome ships concurrently with new construction of others,
'igure 20 illustrates this exact problem that faces the
>E 1052/DE 1978 class.
Assuming that the pay load/platform interfaces are
irmly established and pre-negotiated and firmly adhered
o, modularity has the potential to permit parallel
evelopment of payload and platform and avoid the risk
ue to concurrency. In this way a combatant can be designed
nd delivered to the feet in almost half the time. This,
f course, increases the shaded area under the Military
brth Decay Curve, increases the operational effectiveness
nd the ROI.
Ease of modernization and conversion and the reduced
ime involved is perhaps the most widely publicized and
dvocated reasons for the application of the modular
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oncept. The worth decay curve not only applies to new
onstruction but also to an existing ship awaiting a
ew weapons suit in a M & C which studies show has an
verage duration of 28 months. With the judicious balance
f modularity featues, interface simplification and
mproved integration methods significant time savings
re likely.
The combination of decreased development time,
; & C time, (overhaul, maintenace, and repairs time)
aturally adds up to greatly increased ship availability
'hich means a decrease in the amount of time a ship is
either not available or only partially capable to perform
ts intended mission. The present operating profile
>f a Navy combatant approximately consists of four regular
>verhaul periods each of six month duration, and one
lodernization and one conversion requiring about twenty
lonths each of all which fits into an operational lifetime of
15 years. For these figures an "off line" time of at least
iwenty percent is expected if one also considers the fact
:hat the ship is still only partially available as the
result of reliability (MTBF) and repair (MTTR) problems,
rherefore a combatant availability of 85% is considered
realistic if not optimistic.
The inprovement in availability can best be
illustrated in Figure 21.
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It is assured that extensive use of modular concepts
can reduce off line periods by as much as 50% (i.e. M & C
requiring 10 months vs. 20 months) which boosts average system
availability to 95%. In addition availability is further
extended by increasing the life expectancy. This is
accomplished by replacing the high failure rate building
block type submodules with more reliable units and
leaving the basic more durable segment of the system
intact. It should be pointed out that the above illustration
and figures are more of a goal rathern than fact. However,
the improved availability is considered achievable.
The last element of increased operational
effectiveness is that of incremental M & C. The present
approach to upgrading weapon systems is to wait until the
entire system is obsolete. If regular interval updating
of key components in the system most prone to obsolescence,
significant higher Military Worth is achieved,
As illustrated in Figure 22 the useful system life (shaded
area) under system replacement is substantially less than
that of incremental modernization at the component level.
Very often in any payload system the rates of obsolescence
of its various components are all different. Therefore
replacement of these components as they become obsolete
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/stem are obsolete makes more sense. However this can only
la achieved if the initial design of a system adheres to
he philosophy of "Design to Change" down to the component
avel.
. 5 Imapct on Ship Design Acquisition Cost, Volume, Wt.
Early studies investigating the costs and benefits
«f modular ship construction show that practically all the
;ajor ship's characteristics (cost, volume, displacement,
'sight) are impacted. These studies also indicate that
ost benefits are possible if certain penalties are
filing to be incurred; the biggest being increased
cquisition costs for new construction. The National
ecurity Industrial Association in their modular study
oncluded that modular combatants cost approximately 4% more
an conventional ships. However because of the greater
ailability of the modular ship, NSIA went on to show
hat 83 ships would do the same job as 100. Thus, there
s an acquisition cost savings of about:
100 (1 - 1.04 x 0.83) = 14%.
avings in personnel and maintenance would lead to decreased





Perhaps the major reason for increased acquisition
ost is the necessity for greater internal volume resulting
n larger ships compared to conventional types with
ission effectiveness held constant. This increase has
een estimated to be seven to eight percent. Simply
roviding space margins for future systems is not sufficient
f the platofrm is to be truly adaptable to change; the
onfiguration of space provided is important. Also a
eans of trunking services to the module are desirable and
rovisions for module shipping and unshipping routes must
e carefully designed. Clear access to platform areas
n which modules are located are important becuase time
nd cost savings are very much dependent on clear shipping
nd unshipping routes. In addition, the removal and
retaliation of module should have little if any effect
n surrounding structures. A final point to keep in
:ind for internal volume and topside accessibility is that
irect vertical movement of modules is more easily
chieved than lateral movement.
The second contributor to increased acquisition
ost is the increased displacement of the modular ship
"iich shows up almost entirely in the hull structure
fit. group 1) . This increase has been estimated at about
On the SCS for instance hatches and access requirements




ock was penetrated by modularity. In addition the increased
alume and displacement increases the gross characteristics
Length, beam, draft) of the conventional design. This in
irn impacts powering requirements and fuel weights.
The complex interface problems between modules and
htween modules and platform is perhaps the largest obstacle
ad challenge to the modular ship designer. The interfaces
a most cases demands arrangement changes and perhaps
^location or deletion of certain invisible areas. Shipping
rcess must be provided for each and every module for
npid removal and installation however many cost effective
ues of modularity are often located deep in the hull
sich as sonar gear, chill and reefer spaces, etc.
As previously mentioned the changes to ship systems
rt)st likely occur with mission related or payload systems
cid therefore a motivation exists for clear payload/platform
c.stinction and separation. However this separation in
:;sign is clearly contrary to present day destroyer design
ai which emphasis is placed on tight system integration
br the sake of volume economy. The separation is
firther complicated because most of the "support" systems
hlfill dual functions in supporting both platform and
fiyload. For instance a typical destroyer's combat system
£:counts for 50% of its acquisition cost yet only 25%
c the enclosed volume and 10-15% of the light ship weight.
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"he support services however for both payload and platform
-.urpass the payload weight platform cost and both platform
md payload in volume. The crucial question left to the
;hip designer in modularizing the payload subsystems is
leciding whether support systems should be considered as
>art of the platform or as part of the payload.
The designer must also be concerned with module
ompatability . Configuration compatability between the
eplacement module and the ship platofrm installed site
iust exist. Also designated modules and platform
ocations must have entity characteristics such as weight,
enter of gravity shock resistance, environmental
equirements, etc. Compatability of operation and support
ervice interfaces between modules and between module
nd platform is another consideration the designer must face
Finally the designer has to address the actual
ardware of the interfaces. The efficiency in installation,
emoval and exchange of modules is a strong function of the
nterfaces between module and platform. These interfaces
ay be simplified by several means such as buffering
hrough the use of adaptors which however is considered
o be a brute force type method. Standardization simplifies
he exchange of one module for another and eliminates
he need for adaptors and connectors. Consolidation
educes the number of module that must be buffered or
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tandardized. Finally complete interface elimination
ould be the ultimate in simplification but carries with
t an increased cost. This would be accomplished for
nstance by having a weapons system complete with its own
uxiliary services.
.6 Miscellaneous Areas of Impact
Fire is still the chief cause of damage to naval
hips today and modularity unfortunately does not alleviate
he situation. In fact, fir and flooding constitute
he prime risk areas of modularity. Fire and flooding
oundaries cannot be established around the modular
ontainers because they cannot be economically built to
thstand fire and flooding. However large scale functional
odules such as weapons and magazines can be made watertight
nd fire resistant by fabricating a total enclosure of steel
r shielded aluminum. Containers of non metallic materials
ose their structural integrity in a fire or give off
oxic gases and are therefore undesirable. Finally the
abor and expense of providing certified DC penetrations
nd openings for access would not be justified.
i
. 7 Summary
In Chapter 4 the concept of modularity as it applies
o ship design is defined and the different levels of
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uodules are established. Also previous uses of modularity
rfere discussed however most of these were related only to
the construction phase of the ship. The fact remains that
the concept has barely been scratched at eh surface. The
need still exists to improve the modernization and
conversion of major combatants not only because of the
increasing amounts of time and money necessary to modernize
ships, but also because of the frequency of necessity
to do so. This need can only be met by a new liberal
approach to ship design and imaginative application of
nodern technology. The design approach of modularity
is intended to reduce overhaul periods, thus precluding
excessive ship costs related to non operational time.
Several Navy programs are in the development stages
at present that recognize these ships design needs and
the benefits associated with modularity. The Seamod
Program (SEA Systems MODification and MODernization by
40Dularity and Inter MODularity) is intended to address the
question of modularity by a comprehensive approach which
considers the opportunity for pre packaging and factory
checkout, as well as methods to reduce the ship input overhaul
period by developing containerized payload systems,
rhe intent is to shorten inport ship time by reducing
ripout and installation time. Naturally, there will be
decreases in ship usable payload weight and volume and an
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increase in the budgetary and planning process. However the
ROI should clearly be in greatly reduced life cycle costs
and increased availability.
In order to meet the changing threat SEAMOD
emphasizes the need for rapid and continual fleet
modernization. The modernization costs may well increase
but the goal is to decrease the cost associated with dead
import time for crew and ship. Seamod also requires a
clear functional distinction and definition of power,
water. The proposed benefits of the SEAMOD concept
are: improved af fectiveness , reduced modernization time
and costs, more efficient use of personnel and accelerated
innovation in research and development.
The ARAPAHD concept is one of several modular
concepts being considered to supplement conventional Sea
Control forces by providing merchant ships with their own
indigenous defense. Its principal aim in container
standardization and configuration is to develop the
capability to readily adapt ARAPAAD modular payload to
a range of host ships without the need for costly and
impractical changes to structure and hull fittings. Four
basic areas of the concept are: the host ship, the
ASW helicopters, the Navy flight crews and support personnel




The Navy's Test and Evaluation Ship, another concept
.till in the early stages, attempts to conduct test and
;valuation of new shipboard systems and equipment in a
ealistic environment. Its major features include the
apability of rapid refit, ability to conduct parallel
;esting, commonality of test support facilities and platform
lependability . These features however depend on extensive
jse of modular concepts including checkout of modules
Drior to shipboard installation. In addition, maximum
flexibility is necessary so that new test payload candidates
nay be accepted with minimum modifications. Extensive
use is made of existing quick-acting interface connections
between test payload and platform.
Changes to a naval ship over its lifetime are a
virtual certainty. These changes are brought on by one
or a combination of the following reasons:
1. Changing threats or inability to correctly
forecast the threat.
2. Changing defense priorities.
3. Evolving technology.
4. Deteriorating systems as a result of
physical wear.




6. Correcting design deficiencies or
construction
.
7. Correcting erroneous decisions made at
the time of concept development.
Therefore, future navy ships must be designed with the
Idea of change in mind so that a more rapid means of up-
dating shipboard equipment at periodic intervals not
associated with shipyard overhauls, thus extending the
overhauls cycle.
The modular design concept appears to be a viable
solution to the problems the Navy faces with its ships
lowever life is not quite so easy. There are still many
questions and issues which need addressing. Two such
ritical issues of importance are the resolution of
figuration compatability to minimize the impact of module
exchange on the ships and the necessity for standards
for interface connections Navy wide. It appears that the
only way to resolve the above and provide a final
assessment of the exact costs and benefits is by brute
force. In other words, a separation of payload and
platform must be performed in an actual design at the
expense of planning and budgeting dollars as well as
hardware procurement and ship volume. However this
additional initial investment should be more than offset
by a decreased life cycle cost. The major reduction in
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operation life cycle costs show up in manning costs which
are as mentioned in Chapter 3 the most significant
life cycle cost. Also the navy faces the problem of fewer
people for sea duty as a result of the all volunteer
service. With the increased application of the small scale
functional modules both these problems can be partially
alleviated because manning skill levels should be reduced
appreciably.
Modularity exists in many forms from the construction
sections and large scale functional units down to the plug
in plug out circuit boards. However the intent is not to
propose using all the features all the time but to propose
judicious selection of that combination of features that
maximize the benefits derived under the contraints at hand.
The problem is to determine the degree of modularity which
is best and the extent to which it should be applied
to new ship designs -- modularity -- to what extent?
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5. MODULARITY DESIGN APPROACH
5. 1 Establishing the Need
From Chapters 3 and 4 it is obvious that the judicious
use of modularity in ship design has far reaching benefits
which appear somewhat to solve the many problems facing the
Navy with their combatants. These include reduced availability
becuase of lengthy M & C, spiraling costs of new acquisitions,
reduced funds, and man power shortage just to mention a few.
Dbviously the Navy desires to extend modularity as far as
possible beyond the present state of the art. However, the
designer is faced with several major questions which need
addressing. The first is how much modularity does the Navy
actually need in their ships? The easiest way to answer
this at present is somewhere between the present state of
the art and the technically infeasible range. The designer
needs a simplistic methodology to aid him in selecting a
level of modularity which represents the best trade off
between the benefits he seeks and the increased acquisition
cost. However, before the designer can address this
problem he must first know the actual costs and actual
benefits that are derived with each module in his design.
In addition he must be able to identify the point at which
modules become technically infeasible and the point at
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hich they became economically infeasible. This, of course,
equires an extensive quantitative cost-benefit type
nalysis.
.2 Cost Benefit Methodology
Because a qualitative model for determining the
xact impacts of the expanded use of modularity goes far
eyond the technical capabilities of this author a design
ethodology utilized by industry in the Navy's DX/DXG program
hall be briefly outlined.
The designer first of all must establish some basic
roundwork in order to get him headed in the right direction.
his can best be accomplished by establishing a frame of
eference consisting of two basic features.
1. The establishment of levels of modularity.
2. The identification of technical and
management considerations which may be
constrain the application of modularity
to a ship.
• 3 Establish Levels of Modularity
The designer in this methodology is not so much
nterested in the many construction package techniques,
lthough they provide time and cost benefits during the
onstruction period they do nto really qualify as "modules"
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unless they also incorporate provisions which facilitate
ease of renewal.
However, the modules are not limited to a specific
category of ship material (such as hull structure,
mechanical, electrical or electronics) or level of
application. Therefore to facilitate an orderly and
comprehensive study, the modules, as suggested in Ref. 3,
should be divided into two broad categories: physical
envelope (ship structure) and equipment units. Each of
these are broken down into four sub categories so that
all possible module types are fully convered. These include
1. Physical Envelope Category
P-l A major section of the ship structure
or superstructure.
P-2 A group of spaces within the ship
structure or superstructure.
P-3 A single space within the ship structure
of superstructure.
P-4 A unit appended to the ship or super-
structure which changes the basic envelope
of the ship - a podule.
2
. Equipment Unit Category
E-l A major equipment grouping (e.g.




E-2 An assembly of components within one or
more equipment groupings (e.g. gas turbine
plus propulsion generator, air conditioning
plant)
.
E-3 A total component (e.g. gas turbine or
the compressor of a air conditioning plant.
E-4 Lowest designated assemblies -
constructions of pieces for parts below
the E-3 level.
.4 Technical and Managerial Considerations and Constraints
In determining the technical feasibility of the
arious potential modular candidates the designer needs
o keep the following technical factors in mind:
1. The physical enclosure module may effect the
watertight and gas tight integrity of the ship.
The use of the physical module could create
additional avenues for egress of water or
gas into the hull envelope.
2. In providing for removability of large modules,
the structural integrity of the ship would have
to be maintained. The strength of the ship's
structure could be impaired by removal of




3. A physical enclosure module would require
structural integrity within itself. In
addition to the requirement that each module
has sufficient strength to permit its lifting
and handling, it would have to possess
sufficient rigidity to protect alignment
of installed equipment.
4. Compatability of the weight and center of
gravity of interchangeable modules would be
necessary. Since the center of gravity and
weight of the total ship is a composite of
these items, any significant change caused
by an exchange of the modules can have either
anadverse or beneficial effect on the ship's
center of gravity and stability.
5. CompatabiliLy of spatial configuration of
related exchangeable modules is required,
that is their size, shape and mounting must
be similar.
6. The modular design would have to provide
for easy removal and installation.
7. The design would have to accommodate the
diverse, non-standard equipments and components
available. Because very little standardization
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exists among manufacturers a certain degree of
flexibility of design is mandatory.
8. Concentration on large sized modules may de
emphasize the benefits to be obtained from
lowest level modules. The module design should
take into consideration the need for fault
identification quickly and simply by shipboard
personnel. Numerical and skill level
manpower reductions are predominately
associated with the lowest level assemblies.
9. Design of modules would require compatability
with the weight lifting capacity of building
and conversion facilities.
Perhaps the most important managerial consideration
Ls the anticipation of specific equipment changes during
:he design. Unless the plans for changes materialize
Little benefit could be envisage during the ships life as
i result of a modular approach. However, if provisions
cor modular design can be provided which will facilitate




5. 5 Net Worth Estimating Procedure
Once the designer has made a wide ranging search of
all the possible applications and types of modularity and
nas weeded out those considered technically impossible,
;he economic feasibility must be determined on each of the
emaining candidate. In order to properly assess the
sxact impacts of a particular modular over the ship's
.ife cycle, the life cycle should be divided up into phases
vhich are further broken down into segments.
The major phases of a ship's life cycle include
:he development phase, the investment phase and the
operational phase. The development phase consists of
such one time cost items as subsystem and equipment
ievelopment, conceptual feasibility and preliminary design
)hase. The investment phase consists of:
1. detailed engineering
2. construction and test facilities
and equipment
3. ship materials and equipment
4. ship construction and outfitting
5. ship testing











The methodology up to this point has been fairly
itraightforward, however, at this point it falls short
)ecause a valid measure of the affects of the application
>f modularity does not really exist because there is no
>r little accumulated data in the subject. What further
implicates the matter is that the determination of modular
:ost and benefit impacts on the ship's life cycle assumes
:hat the basic ship's life cycle cost is known. The fact
_s that only estimating procedures exist consisting of
.mperical relations to determine the various costs a
;hip experiences over its life time. The preferable
leans to measure the modularity net worth would be a precise
mmerical technique, however, at present no such measure
-S available. Present approachsdepend upon the judgement
)f the individuals applying the "tape measure". Therefore,
because no rigorous method exists and because much
:echnical expertise is required in this area, it does not
ippear necessary to outline the existing estimating procedures
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;n addition for convenience in interpretation of results,
t would be highly desirable to utilize a universally
ipplied unit of value within the methodology. Since cost
ncreases and savings are normally measured in dollar
inits, and since operational availability can be expressed
is "military worth in dollars". the method should
ncorporate the conversion of all benefits to conversion
ralue units-dollars.
3.6 Modularity Net Worth a of the DX/DXG Study
What needs to be brought out at this point are the
results of the Booz Allen study (Ref. 3) forthe cost
benefit analysis on the expanded modularity use in the
)X/DXG program. The measurements of these impacts,
accomplished by implementation of the above methodology,
tfas directly related to the postulated operational profile
}f any given ship. These were the baselines from which
any charge generated by the use of modularity was calculated
The major impacts were bacially in three areas:
first of all an increase in life cycle cost mostly reflected
in acquisition cost was estimated as 1% of the life cycle
-ost. Ship availability was estimated at 2.3%. Finally
additional benefits which consisted mostly of increased
reliability, and maintainability and reduced manning skill
levels were estimated at 2.7%.
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Once the designer has these figures for the most
technically and economically feasible modular design, he
nust decide whether he needs this much modularity or will
a lesser amount sufficiently meet his needs.
5.7 Suggested Techniques in Determing - How Much
Modularity
5.7.1 Introduction
The previous sections of Chapter 5 outlined a
nethodology for determing that degree of modularity that is
zechnically feasible in the present state of the art. It
also analyzed the economic feasility through a cost benefit
analysis of each technically feasible module on the various
segements of a ship's life. The resulting design should
De the most modularized vessel possible within the state
Df the art and still technically feasible.
The next question the design tea.n should ask
:hemselves is okay we have the most modularized design
ve can possibly get which costs us a little bit more to
acquire but the increase in investment returns such as
Increased benefits (e.g. increased availability, increased
naintainability , reduced manning skill levels and some
:osts reduction over the ship's life time) are much more,
iowever, do we need or even want to employ this amount of
nodularity? Do we need this amount of increase in ship
ivailability or can we settle for a lesser amount and do
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ve want to pay more for acquisition? This, of course, is
a most difficult set of questions to answer for several
treasons. First of the all design process does not consist of
Dne person or even a small group of people but an extremely
Large combination of engineers, managers and operators
ooth in the civilian and Navy community. Certainly in
bhe design community there are many opinions on how much
to modularize depending on each ones philosophy. The CNO
nay have one set of ideas or opinions on the subject,
however, Congress who approves the Navy's budget may have
iifferent ideas. The taxpayer who ultimately pays for new
defense systems may have a third set of opinions. Finally
the overall design philosophy in vogue at the time has a
najor import on the decision. If performance is not
absolutely necessary; if the level of enemy threat is
relatively low then a DTC philosophy may be the design's
driving force where acquisition cost is the primary concern
and performance secondary. A full modularized ship with
95% availability may not be necessary. However, if the
design stresses performance and mission effectiveness then
a high degree of modularity and availability may be desired.
To cloud the issue even further, the design community may
envision many changes in the design philosophy and level of
enemy threat from the time a ship enters the fleet until
it retires. The obvious answer to this is to expect the
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'orst and design a ship accordingly, however , this is not
lways economically feasible. What is needed therefore
s a tool to aid the decision maker (e.g. design community,
avy, CNO, etc.) in selecting a level of modularity which
est meets his needs, desires and budget.
.7.2 Net Present Value
Chapter 4 presented the idea of Naval ship acquisition
s an investment and discussed methods to increase the
eturns on this investment. As in the corporate and private
ector there are several management tools that may aid the
nvestor (e.g. the Navy) in answering the above questions.
Several techniques shall be presented and analyzed to
etermine their applicability and their advantages and
isadvantages.
The first of these techniques is the Net Present
alue method which is a discounted cash-flow approach to
apital budgeting in the corporate sector. With the present
alue method, all cash flows for a given investment are
scounted to present value using the required rate of
aturn:
n
tNPV = I A./U + K)
t=0
K = required rate of return
t = year in which cash inflow or expense occurs
n = life of project in years




If the sum of these discounted cash flows is equal to, or
greater than 0, the proposal is accepted; if not it is
rejected. Another way to express the acceptance criterion
is to say that the project will be accepted if the present
value of cash inflows exceeds the present value of cash
Dutflows. If several projects are being considered then
naturally the one with the greatest net present value will
De chosen.
For the ship design problem several levels of
nodularity can be analyzed using the NPV method. The
lighest level would be the one which incorporates as many
'-1, P-2, P-3, P-4, El, E2, E3, E4 modules as economically
ind technically feasible as otulined in the proceeding
nethodology. Lower levels are considered those that
incorporate fewer number of modules (e.g. fewer system and
subsystem modules) . The lowest level may be considered that
me which incorporates just the state of the art modules.
ror each level the increase in acquisition cost is computed
n addition to the cost savings, cost increase and increased
benefits that occur over the life cycle of the ship,
^ach of these are discounted to present value. As in the
corporate sector, naturally the level of modularity with
:he greatest NPV is the level to design to.
The method appears straight forward and easy




dissimilarities of government and private expenditures the
method loses its usefulness. First of all it seems
reasonable to assume that the greatest benefits are
Dbtained with the highest yet still economically and technically
feasible level of modularity. Increased availability is
oerhaps considered the biggest and most desirable benefit
Dver the life cycle, however, most of the increase is
lirectly attributable to the implementation of the higher
Level category of modules (e.g. P-l, P-2, E-l, F-2 type
nodules) which contain the payload systems and subsystems.
?his level of modularity is probably pushing the highest
reasible level. The below graph is a rough approximation










Level of Modularity (increases)
.lthough the acquisition cost is much greater at this level,
PV would still appear to be greatest. This tells the
esigner and operator not to worry about lower levels but
o always design to the fullest extent of modularity.
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s mentioned previously this decision is not always in line
ith the ship design priorities.
A second drawback is that apples and oranges are
eing mixed in this analysis. Namely the NPV method only
andles cash flows or monatory units. Therefore, the
nalyst is faced with the problem of converting such benefits
s increased availability, increased reliability and
attainability , reduced manning skill levels, etc. into
nits of dollars - needless to say not an easy task,
lso, the analysis is only as good as the procedure
or estimating the actual costs and benefits of the modular
asign.
Finally the fundamental question and one which has
2en discussed and debated on in great length is what if
iy discount rate should be used? In the corporate sector
ie discount rate has a large bearing on the NPV of any
ivestment to the extent that a slight change may switch
ie NPV rankings among several candidates. The problem is
^wever, more basic becuase of the very nature of
Dvernment expenditure especially on military defense
ivestments. It is very difficult to justify even using
discount rate let alone trying to select one. In the
orporate sector the discount rate is considered the
)st of capital that is utilized in funding a particular
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nvestment. This funding may come from within such as its
ash on hand and from an issue of stock, or from a bank
oan or a combination of all three. The government on
he other hand receives its funds from essentially one
ource - the public. The government maximizing rate





government borrowing rate 4.7
Less
personal income tax on interest 1.6
Plus
corporate taxes foregone 4.6
personal income taxes foregone 2.0
9.7%
What negates the use of the NPV approach in the
overnment sector is the non-marketable nature of the investment
'he investment is considered non-marketable because ownership
ihares in it cannot be traded in the capital market
. e. on the stock exchange. Furthermore, the U.S. government
oes not operate at a profit. For ship acquisition the
evenue of its investment is in the form of service to the
ountry, therefore, service equals capitalization costs.
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\ vessel, however, does not have to operate at 100%
ivailability to earn revenue. However, revenue (service) is lost,
luring unscheduled breakdowns and its scheduled yard
ivailability. Because of these drawbacks, forcing the
JPV approach into the government investment sector would
laturally lead to erroneous results.
.7.3 Internal Rate of Return and Payback Period
Some may argue that the Internal Rate of Return
lethod is a more reasonable approach since a discount factor
.s not required. The IRR for an investment proposal
s the discount factor that equates the present value of
:he expected cash outlfows with the present value of the
expected inflows.
n A.
E [ =-r - 0]
t=0 (l+r) c
'he acceptance criterion generally employed with the
:RR method is to compare the internal rate of return with
I required rate of return known as a cut-off or hurdle
ate.; the hurdle rate normally being the firm's cost of
capital. If the IRR exceeds this rate the project is
iccepted; if not it is rejected. In considering several
projects, that one with the greatest IRR is usually selected.
'his method like the NPV, however, is essentially corporate
>riented and needless to say suffers from the same drawbacks.
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A third and final suggested approach is a simple
"breakeven" analysis of each level of modularity. In this
rase the breakeven point may be considered the payback
period of the investment; that is the point in time in
which the initial cash investment is recovered. In this
case it is the number of years required for the life cycle
cost savings and the modular derived benefits to offset
the increased acquisition cost. The selection criterion
would be to select that project which has the shortest payback
period. Like the others it has serious drawbacks such as it
fails to consider the time value of money and does not
consider cash flows after the payback period. In addition
it aoes not take account of the magnitude or timing of
cash flows. Finally the problem of mixing apples and
oranges exists with this analysis.
5.C Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis
The previous methods all seemed to suffer from
common drawbacks. Therefore what is needed is a design/decision
approach which:
1. Is able to work with acquisition cost, savings
and benefits without having to convert to
common units.
2. Incorporates a design philosophy or design priorities
3. Incorporates the possibility of a changing enemy




4. Is not necessarily corporate oriented.
5. Considers the utility of the buyer in
investment decisions.
The decision process that best meets the criteria
is the combination of multi-attribute utility theory and
decision tree analysis. Basic utility theory and decision
tree analysis are common and familiar tools presently
used by managers in many decision analysis studies. However,
Tiulti-attribute utility theory is a fairly new concept and
is worth further discussion. Like the single attribute
utility theory, the decision maker's utility towards a
rommodity is assessed throuyh a structured series of lotteries.
The commodity need not be solely in units of dollars and
in fact such things as reaction time, accuracy, etc. may
oe the attribute being assessed. Therefore, the multi-attribute
theory is exactly as its name implies: the decision maker's
atility assessment of more than one attribute at the same time.
For this study a two attribute case shall be selected
nd the decision maker's utility assessed. The attributes
are the two biggest impacts of modularity: increased
acquisition cost and increased availability. Obviously
an increase in availability is desirable while an increase in
acquisition cost is considered undesirable therefore an
increasing acquisition cost would have a decreasing




increasing utility. The problem could easily be expanded
into a more then two attribute problem because there are
more benefits derived from expanded modularity design
other than increased availability over the life cycle.
Increased R & M, reduced manning skills and reduced design
time are as previously mentioned additional benefits
and could also be incorporated. However, availability is
by far the largest benefit and is the easiest to estimate
and measure. The others are much more difficult to
estimate and quantify. Therefore, only the utility of trading
off acquisition cost ana availability will be analyzed.
It is also assumed that the decision maker for this
case is not necessarily a single individual but a
combination of those groups in the Navy that are going to
purchase the ship and those that are goint to operate it.
In addition the decision maker's utility assessment is based
on the acquisition of a large class (e.g. more than 50 units)
of combatant type vessels which include the frigates,
the destroyers and the cruisers. The multi-mission ships
such as these show the greatest promise of increased benefits
from expanded use of modularity. The electronic and weapons
payload systems for these ships are the most sensitive to
technology change and show a much higher rate of obsolescence
than the payload items on other types of Navy ships. A
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Mavy tanker or tender would not reap nearly as much benefit
from modularity since its payload items are fairly static
in nature. That is a significant increase in availability
^ould not reasonably be expected since they do not require
frequent and extensive M & C as do the combatants.
5.0.1 Defining the Consequence Space
Appendix A outlines the general procedure for
developing the two attribute utility functions that was followed
in this study. The first step was to introduce the terminology
ind items to the decision maker and develop the consequence
space. For this decision problem cl\e two scalar attributes
:onsisted of acquisition cost and availability. The range
3f acquisition cost was based on the outcome of the
( 3
)
)X/DXG modularity study by Booz Allen Applied Research the
study showed that expanded modularity increased acquisition
:ost by approximately 5%. Therefore, it was assumed that
in austere design that incorperates the basic state of the
irt in modularity costs $100-million to design and build,
:he expanded modular deisgn cost $105-million. This
lay appear at first to be an insignificant spread on the
icquisition cost, however, when one considers an
icquisition program of 60 ships the additional 5-million
>er ship is no longer insignificant. The second attribute,
tvailability, ranges from 75% to 95%. These figures are by
10 means unrealistic, however, the basis of their selection
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will be presented later in this chapter. What bears
mentioning at this point, however, is that present ship
availability is approximately 80-85%. The consequence space
that was used follows:
1.0 x 10 8 <_ x <_ 1.05 x 10
8
75% < y < 95%
and is illustrated in Figure
5.3.2 Verifying Utility Independence
Utility independence of each attribute was verified
next. This was accomplished by posing several structured
lotteries to the decision maker. Because the actual
decison makers in the Ilavy department were not readily
available in order to assess their utility on this subject,
several of the Navy and Coast Guard students and faculty
in the Ocean Engineering Department were asked to put
themselves in the position of the actual D/M. Although
the simulated results of the utility assessment may not be
exactly those of the real life D/M, what is important is the
methodology in preforming the analysis and not the results.
Finally becuase the design philosophy has a great impact
on the entire design process the D/M was asked to keep in
mind the DTC philosophy for this utility assessment. After
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•us formulation was completed and analyzed the D/M was asked
3 switch hats and consider the "Design to Performance" or the
Design to Change" philosophy.
To verify whether x was utility independent of y the
evels of y was chosen at 95% and the range of x from
R 8
.0 x 10 to 1.05 x 10 . After posing several lotteries
r equal probability of (1.0 x 10 , 95) and (1.05, 95) the
ecision maker converged on a value of (1.0], 95) as being





I0TE: Powers have been dropped from acquisition figures.
nhe concentration was next moved to a new set of consequences
/ith a different amount of y in common. This level was
>et at 90% availability. When confronted with similar
:ype lotteries as before the D/M saw no reason to change
lis value for x and felt that the level of y should not
Influence his answer. Therefore the consequence of
[1.01, 80) was equally desirable to the lottery of









From the above results x appears to be utility independent
of y but as one last check a new y level of 75% was
selected. Again the D/M converged on 1.01 for x.
1/2
(1.0, 75)
(1.01, 75) - 1/2
(1.05, 75)
Therefore for the D/M x as Figure 24 illustrates that x was
utility independent of y.
A similar type of lottery structure was used to
determine whether y was U/I of x. To begin with an
o
acquisition cost level of 1.02 x 10 was chosen and an
equal probability of 75% or 95% availability. The D/M
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A new level of x of 1.04 was chosen and again the
/M selected 90% as being equally desirable.
(1.04, 75)
1/2
(1.04, 90) - 1/2
(1.04, 95)
t was assumed with these results that y was U/I of x, Figure 25
. £ . 3 Assessing Conditional Utility Functions
Conditional utility functions were easily assessed
nd in fact the procedure was exactly the same as that of
one attribute function. For two attributes, one attribute
as fixed and the utility of the other was assessed over its
ntire range. To begin with, however, the sacle had to be
rbitrarily set. For this analysis the following values






























!n deriving the conditional utility function of x, y was
>et at 95% and the D/M was again posed with a set of
.otteries. From the verification of U/I, however, one point














u-, (1. 05, 95) = - 1.0
.". u^l. 01, 95) = - .5












u-^1. 01, 95) = - .5
11,(1.05, 95) = - 1.0
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(1. 05, 95) = - .5
.". u
1
(1. 005, 95) = - .25
The conditional utility function for x is depicte d in Figure 26
In a similar fashion the conditional utility
function of y was derived with x set at 1.0. Also from the




(1.0,75) ;u (1.0,75) = - 1.0
1/2
(1. 0, 90) -
1/2
(1. 0,95) ;u 2 (1. 0,95) =0.0
.*. u
2
(l. 0, 90) = - .5






















(l. 0,90) = - .5
.*. u
2
(1. 0, 86) = - .75
The above points established the conditional utility curve
.or y, Figure 27. At this point the conditional utility
functions appeared to be consistent with what one would
expect in the real world situation under the DTC concept.
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FIGURE 26 Conditional Utility Plot of X; u 1 (x,95)
FIGURE 27 Conditional Utility Plot of Y; u 2 (1.0,4)
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The curves showed a definite risk proneucss; that is the
utility of the expected value was less than the expected
value of the utility.
u(E(x) ) < E(u(x) )
The D/M was perhaps likely to gamble a little bit
with the acquisition cost in trading off the ship's
availability.
5.8.4 Assessing the Scaling Constants
The third step in formulating the utility function
was to compute the scaling constants. To begin, the scale
wasagain arbitrarily set to the following limits:
I. u(1.05, 95) =0.0
u(l. 05, 75) = -1.
II. To the D/M the consequence (1.05, 95) was preferred
to the consequence (1.0, 75), however, the
consequence (1.05, 95) was equally desirable to
(1.0, 80)
.
(1.05, 95) > (1.0, 75)
(1.05, 95) - (1.0, 80)
III Set u(1.05, 95) = a
±
u(1.0, 75) = a 2
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Therefore from the above
u (x, 95) = - a-^ (x, 95)









n, From Figures 25 and 26
u
2
(l. 0, 80) = - . 94
u
1
(1. 05, 95) =-1.0
.'. a, = .94 a
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X. From Figures 26 and 27
u
x
(1.01, 95) = - .43
u 2
(1.0, 90) = - . 53
















- . 02 U;L (x, 95) u 2 (1 . , y
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The three dimensional utility plane is illustrated
in Figure 28.
5.9 Decision Tree Formulation
5.9.1 Introduction
The utility function for the modular design under DTC
as derived in the last section has very little meaning in
the decision analysis unless the utilities are employed in a







Acquisition Cost X 1. 05
FIGURE 28 Utility Plane; u(x,y)
NOTE: All utilities have been increased by 1.0 in order
to move the plane onto the positive utility scale
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modularity is needed. One may ask why not use the actual
payoffs or expenses in the decision tree rather than their
equivalent utilities. Unfortunately, not everyone is an
EMVer; that is, one that selects the Expected Monetary Value
in all lotteries. In fact, most people exhibit either risk
proneness or risk averseness in choosing a utility
equivalent for a given lottery. A D/M as defined in the last
section, is risk averse if the expected value of a lottery
is greater then the certainty equivalent or that consequence
that is equally desirable to the lottery. That is:
u[E(x) ] > E[u(x) ]
Of course, risk proneness is the exact opposite. The risk
premium is defined as the difference between the expected
value and the certainty equivalent.
R/P = EV - CE
Therefore because the D/M is not always an EMV'er, by
expressing the decision tree "payoffs" in terms of
utility the D/M 1 s proneness or averseness to risk is
captured in the decision tree structure thus giving more
meaningful results in choosing the most profitable or least




In order to structure the tree several assumptions
were made relative to the impact of modularity on
availability and to the number of modernizations and conversions
a combatant may undergo during a lifetime. First of all
from the results of the Booz Allen Study it was assumed that
the highest level of feasible modularity in a ship design
reduced M & C time by 50% and ROH time by 25%. In addition
no matter how much modularity was employed, all ships had
the same life span - 25 years. Finally, it was assumed that,
based on the extrapolation of current data, the possibility
existed that a combatant may undergo 3 M & C in a 25 year
lifetime depending on the rate of technology.
Figures 2^, 30 and 31 were derived from the information
in Table 1 and formed the basis of the previous assumption. The
significant points in these figures are that due to the
increased rate of obsolescence the length of time from launch tr
the first M & C has become shorter and shorter with the newer
ships. The duration of the M & C, however, has been greatly
reduced due to the increased use of lower level modules in
recent years. With the 1052 class having only about 4 years
of service before its first M & C it is quite conceivable
that this class will have to undergo another M & C before
retirement and not totally impossible that two more will be
required. Therefore, it was assumed that a new design may
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FIGURE 29 Plot: Year Launched vs. Year to
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FIGURE 31 Plot: Years to First M & C vs. Duration of M & C
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Obviously the percent availability of a combatant
depends not only on how many M&C's it undergoes but also
how much modularity exists in the design.
In structuring the tree it was initially assumed
that there were two different ship designs: one which employed
the highest level of modularity feasible and one that only
employed the basic state of the art lower level modules. The
low level deisgn required 20 months for a M & C and 4 months
for each ROH, while the high level design required 10 months
for a M & C and 3 months for a ROH. The following table
lists the availabilities that were computed for each design
based on the above information.
















Low s 7 5%
5.9.3 Bayesian Approach to Decision Analysis
The assumption in the last section was made that a
combatant may undergo 1, 2, or 3 M & C. However obviously
not all three have equal probability of occurring. In
addition the number required depends on the rate of
technology and a measure of this is how soon after launching
the ship requires its first M&C. Obviously if a ship
undergoes a M & C within 4 years after launching then a high
probability exists that an additional M&C will be required
before retirement. Conversely if a ship undergoes its first
M&C 10-12 years after launching then a high probability
exists that it will not require an additional M&C before
retirement.
To formulate the tree using a Bayesion approach
3 states of nature were selected as 1, 2, or 3 M & C per
ship per lifetime. The three outcomes were:
1. A ship receives its first M&C 3-6 yrs. after launching
2. A ship receives its first M&C 7-9 yrs. after launching
3. A ship receives its first M&C 10-12 yrs. after launching
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Finally the author made estimates of the probabilities
of the ship requiring 1, 2, or 3 M & C in a lifetime.
P(l M&C/25 years) = P(I) = .3
P(2 M&C/25 years) = P(II) = .5
P(3 M&C/25 years) = P(III) = .2
In addition the author estimated the following conditional
probabilities.
P(I/ship receives first M&C within 3-6 years) = P(I/1) = .7
P(I/ship receives first M&C within 7-9 years) = P(I/2) = .2
P(I/ship receives first M&C within 10-12 years) = P(I/3) = .1
P(II/1) = .2 P(III/1) = .1
P(II/2) = .6 P(IIl/2) = .2
P(II/3) = .2 P(III/3) = .70
One point needs to be brought out on these
probabilities and that is they are not guaranteed to be
accurate and in fact may be way out of line. The probabilities
are more or less best guesses based on the authors knowledge
of this topic. However, the important thing is not the data
generated nor the results but the way the data is used to
obtain the results in the methodology.
The following conditional probabilities were obtained
through Bayes Theorem and the above probabilities.
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P(I) = P(1)P(I/1) + P(2)P(I/2) + P(3)P(I/3)
= .3x .7 + .5x .2+ .2x .1
= .33
P(II) = P(1)P(II/1) + P(2)P(II/2) + P(3)P(II/3)
= .3x .2+ . 5 x .6+ .2x .2
= .4
P(III) = P(1)P(III/1) + P(2)P(III/2) + P(3)(III/3)
= .3x .1+ . 5 x .2+ .2x .7
= .27
P(1/I) = mipuzi) (-3)^. 7 ) . 636
„,,,., P(2)P(I/2) (.5) (.2)
1
' ' P(I) .33
P( 3/I, = P(3 »^" /3) - .064
In order to structure a meaningful decision tree
the D/M needs more than just two levels of modularity to
choose from. That is, the methodology would not be very
helpful if the high level modular design and the low level
design were the only ones of interest to the D/M. The D/M
is more than likely interested in designing to a level of
modularity which is somewhere in between the high and low
level designs. He probably does not want to pay the
additional acquisition cost of the high level design nor
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does he need all the added availability. On the other hand,
the low level design may not offer enough flexibility
in order to accomplish quick and efficient M & C.
Therefore for this decision problem two intermediate
modular levels were added to the high and low level designs.
It was assumed that the modular levels differed mainly in
the extent to which modularity was incorporated; that is
the number of payload subsystems and components modularized
and the number of P-l, P-2, P-3, and P-4 modules incorporated
It was further assumed that the increase in acquisition
costs of these two intermediate levels in addition to the
increased availability described a linear function in
relation to the high and low level, Figure 32.
From the above assumptions a consequence chart
was drawn up for each level of modularity and for 1, 2
or 3 M & C per lifetime. These consequences were then
converted into their corresponding utilities using the
previously developed DTC utility function for modular
design, Table 3. Finally after all the necessary
probabilities and utilities were computed the actual
decision tree was drawn up and analyzed, Figures 33a & 33b.
Several points should be brought on the decision
tree. First of all there is an upper and a lower branch.
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of the four modular designs (high, B, A, or low) on the upper
branch or gathering additional information and following
the lower branch. The upper branch basically looks at the
four modular levels and their utility outcomes for each of
the possible number of M & C per lifetime. The lower branch
is the second option available to the decision maker. Here
the D/M may elect to gather additional information such as
the approximate obsolescence rate, rate of technology,
and/or the level of enemy threat. With this information
the D/M can perhaps make reasonable estimates of how soon
after commisioning a combatant requires its first M & C.
The lower branch considers three possible outcomes:
1. A ship requires its 1st M&C within 3-6 yrs.
2. A ship requires its 1st M&C within 7-9 yrs.
3. A ship requires its 1st M&C within 10-12 yrs.
Each of these outcomes is followed by the same decision that
exists in the upper branch, however, the additional
information has somewhat altered the probabilities of
)ccurance for the three states of nature (1, 2, or 3 M&C).
By averaging out and folding back in the normal form
)f analysis the best strategy for the D/M turned out to be
:he lower branch (e.g. gathering additional information),
'he selection criteria for this strategy was based on















FIGURE 33b Lower Branch of " DTC" Decision Tree
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branch. However, it was interesting to note that the highest
utility attained in the upper branch was with the low level
modular design.
Obviously one can not reasonably assume that a
study to gather additional information in the lower branch
would be cost free. Therefore, the most one should be willing
to pay for this study would be the difference in the upper
and lower branch utilities (.613 - .539). However, this
figure probably has very little use to the D/M since the
conversion of utility back to a consequence of acquisition
dollars and availability is difficult because the possibility
of multiple roots exists. Also a cost in units of acquisition
dollars and availability is perhaps meaningless.
5.10 Extensive Analysis Form
Because the risk prone nature under the DTC philosophy
drove the decision maker to select the low level design
under all the states of nature an extensive analysis was
performed to investigate the sensitivity of this strategy
to the probabilities of requiring one or more M & C. However,
because four acts and three states of nature were unmanageable
for this analysis the problem was condensed to a two act, two












ship requires its first
M&C within 0-6 years
of commisioning or
7-12 years
build low level modular
ship @ $1.0 x 10 9/ship
or high level modular ship
@ $1.05 x 10 9/ship
In addition the author estimated the following probabilities:
There is a 60% chance of a ship requiring
2 M&C and a 40% chance of only requiring
one
.
Given that a ship requires only one M&C in
a lifetime the probability it occurs within
0-6 years of commisioning is .3 (i.e
P(I/1) = .3 and P(II/1) = .7 also:
P(I/2) = .7 P(II/2) = .3
P(I) = P(1)P(I/1) + P(2)P(I/2)





P(II) = P(1)P(II/1) + P(2)p(H/2)
= .4 (.7) + (.6) (.3)
= .46









.'. P(2/II) = .39
Using the same consequence and utilities for the
nigh and low level design as in the normal analysis, the
lecision tree was set up in Figure 34 and the analysis
performed in Table 4 . From the far right column (EMV)
It was obvious that the D/M had two different strategies
fielding the highest and equal utilities. That is the D/M
:ould either build the low level design or gather additional
.nformation but again build the low level no matter what
-he outcome.
As brought out in the normal form analysis one
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additional information is cost free. Therefore in order to
make the analysis more realistic it was assumed the study
increased the ship acquisition cost by an additional
/r
.25 x 10 dollars. This, of course, changed the utilities












Because the scale for acquisition cost only went up
to 1. 05 the utilities for the high level design had to be
estimatedwhich was based upon the utility change for the low
level design. The new decision tree was constructed,
(Figure 3 5 ) and the analyses performed in Table 5 . Again
building the low level design proved to have the highest
utility and therefore proved to be the best strategy.
The meat of this analysis, however, consisted of
investigating the impacts of the probabilities of the states
of nature (1 or 2 M&C) on the optimal strategy. What the
D/M wanted to know was if the probability of 2 M&C per
lifetime greatly increased or even decreased would strategy 1,
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In order to do so the following equations were
developed from columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 and plotted in
Figure
P = probability of 1 M&C
1-P = probability of 2 M&C
1. P(.606) + (1-P) (.517) = .517 + .089P
2. P(.525) + (1-P) (.236) = .236 + . 289P
3. P(.485) + (1-P) (.375) = .375 + .IIP
4. P(.505) + (1-P) (.275) = .275 + .23P
5. P(.47) + (1-P) (.2) = .2 + .27P
6. P(.52) + (1-P)(.45) = .45 + . 07P
It was obvious from the sensitivity plot that the
optimal strategy (e.g. strategy 1 - build low level)
remained optional throughout the range of P from to 1.0.
The fact that strategy 1 remained optimal was perhaps
caused by the high risk proneness of the D/M and the utility
function. As a comparison to the results of the decision
analysis under the DTC philosophy towards modular ship design
a similar analysis was also performed under a more risk
averse atmosphere that would perhaps exist in a Design to Change
or a performance oriented philosophy. The results of the















FIGURE 36 Strategy Plot
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Some may argue that the subjective probabilities
assigned to one and two M&C may be completely out in left
field or perhaps that the probability of two M&C is zero
because the Navy would never send a ship into a second M&C
due to the great expense. Whether this is true or not the
obsolescence rate goes on the same regardless and data shows
that the point of obsolescence (e.g. point at which the
1st M&C is required) occurs earlier and earlier in the ship's
life with each new ship. Therefore the extensive analysis
of the decision process is designed to outline different
strategies for the ship designer. For the above analysis the
designer had a fairly easy strategy. However, in other
situations he may have several or all strategies become
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For instance in the above illustration four strategies are
optimal at different ranges of probabilities for 1 M&C.
Strategy Qptimality Range
1 . 6 < P < .7
2 <_ P < .45
3 .4 5 < P < . 6
4 . 6 <_ P <_ 1.
5.11 Conclusions
The ship design is an extremely difficult, lengthy
and expensive process and with the trends of increased enemy
threat, reduced acquisition funds, high obsolescence rates
and shifting deisgn philosophies the process does not
appear to be getting easier. The expanded use of modularity
appears to be a viable solution to these problems, however,
to date little has been done in terms of actual hardware
incorporation, and concrete cost benefit analysis. In
addition the designer must decide how much modularity is needed
Obviously an approach that considers the marginal returns
of the life cycle benefits and acquisition cost for various
modules or levels of modularity in the ship design would be
most beneficial to the designer.
In formulating such a methodology some cost benefit
study results were utilized in addition to making some basic
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assumptions that may be grossly inaccurate. However, the
means and not the results is the compatant thing. Certainly
some additional research in the areas of these assumptions
should make the multi-attribute decision tree analysis a
stronger tool. One major drawback, however, as previously
mentioned, is the problem of multiple decision makers in
the design process. Analyzing many different utilities
and reducing them into a single function is not an easy task.
Any problem formulation, however, must begin with some
groundwork and basic assumptions and the ones in the methodology
do not appear to be unmanageable.
Although still in its early stages, the approach
of multi-attribute utility to the problem of analyzing the
cost and benefits over a ships life cycle for various modular




The process of properly assessing multi-attribute
utility functions requires some foresight and improvisation,
however, as in the unidimensional, one attribute case the
assessment procedure can be segamented for discussion
purposes to highlight various aspects which must be completed
Although this thesis focuses on the two attribute utility
function the procedure below applies to a multi-attribute
utility assessment. A quick summary of a procedure in
determing the utility function one might use is
1. Introduce the terminology and ideas.
2. Identify relevent independence assumptions.
3. Assess conditional utility functions.
4. Assess the scaling constant.
5. Check for consistency and iterate.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first step more or less introduces the concept
of utility to the decision maker and familiarizes him
with the framework that is used in the assessment procedure
so that the decision maker and the person assessing are
talking the same language. The decision maker must also
have explained to him the concept of decision analysis
so that he realizes the purpose in assessing his preferences
and is sufficiently motivated to think hard about his
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feelings for the various consequences. If this is not
accomplished before proceeding then confusion is likely
on the part of the decision maker which will lead to
non-consistent and meaningless results. It is then
necessary to verify any of the additive independence,
utility independence, parametric dependence assumptions followed
by step 3 which asseses the individual conditional utility
functions. The functions are then scaled to a common
origin and unit of measure for the overall utility function
u(x,y). Finally the consistency of the function is checked
by further questioning the decision maker about his
preferences and then comparing these to the implications
of u(x,y). If inconsistency results then iteration is
necessary.
The decision problem is then structured and two
scale attributes are chosen (x & y) to describe the
consequence space and then to assess a utility function
over all possible (x,y). A consequence space to aid




It should be made clear to the decision maker that
the preferences are his, that there are no objectively
correct ones and they represent the subjective feelings
of the decision maker.




y v° X. X
X
and that consequence Q is x = x, and y = y, and R is
x = Xp, y = y 2 - He should also realize the directions in
which x & y increase.
The next step is to limit the region over which the
preferences are assessed to as little a region as possible;
that is the maximum and minimum amounts which both x & y
can assume. The preferences that will eventually be
assessed must only be those for consequences (x,y)
x < x < x
1 and y < y < y as depicted in the above
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figure. As a final check on the D/M' s understanding of the
consequence space one nay, ask him if he prefers
consequence T to S. If this agrees with the expected
results then the next segment may be pursued.
II . Verification of Independence Assumptions
Additive Independence
The preferences to be assessed are contained in
the consequence space x <_ y <_ x and y _< y <_ y' and
x and y are additive independent if and only if the lotteries
(x,y) ^- (x 1 ,y)
L
l
Z <^ , ,„ L2
(x',y') ^-^(x.y 1 )
are indifferent for all amount of x,y given a specific
x',y'. The obvious method to verify additive independence
is to select a x' , and y 1 and to see if indifference
between lotteries L, and L 2 hold for some pair of
(x,y)
.
An alternative method for verifying additive
independence involves first of all determining mutual
independence. However, mutual utility independence is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for additive
independence. If x and y are mutually utility independent,
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they are additive independent if there exists ax,, x 2 ,
y, and y~ such that






2 , yi )
are indifferent, where neither (x,,y 2 ) or (x 2 ,y,) are
indifferent to (x-,,y,). On the other hand if there exists
any L-. and L. such that they are not indifferent, then
clearly additive independence cannot hold. The beauty
of additive independence is that the two attribute utility
function (x,y) is merely described over the consequence
space by the addition of the separate conditional utility
functions x and y. Unfortunately, however very few problems
in decision analysis and utility assessment turn out to
be additive independent.
Ill . Utility Independence
With the same scalar attributes x and y being
assessed over the consequence space x <_ x <_ x 1 and
Y < Y < Y* r utility independence is verified by the
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following means. First of all a new consequence space is
constructed to include consequences P, Q, R, S, etc.
















To verify whether x is utility independent of y
the decision maker is asked whether he prefers < P, Q >,
a lottery yielding either P or Q with equal probability,
or S.
The consequence S is chosen so that a particular
answer is expected. The expected answer being that he
would prefer the lottery. The decision maker is then asked
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whether he prefers < P, Q > or T where again T is chosen
as that the expected choice would be the lottery once
again. Next the D/M is inquired about the preferences of
< P, Q > relative to w. Since w is close to S one might
expect the lottery to be preferred once again however
not necessarily. The procedure is continued until a
consequence is converged upon such that the lottery
< P, Q > and the same consequence say R are equally desirable
to the D/M.
If the decision maker indicates any preferences
which do not appear to be consistent with his "true"
preferences, it should be pointed out and discussed again.
It should be pointed out that the method of
convergence above was done with a fixed value of Y; that
is the consequences P, Q, R, S, T and w all had a common
amount of z and only differed in their amount of X. Thus
R is a certainty equivalent for the lottery < P, Q >.
R
Q
Next a similar set of questions are asked the D/M
but with a different amount of Y say y* . The D/M is
asked whether or not he prefers T' to < P', Q' >. To avoid
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a repetition of the previous answers without thinking about
the current questions, T" should be chosen such that the
amount of X and not only the amount of Y, in T and T'
are different. If the D/M prefers T' to < P
' ,
Q' > then
his preference is asked about < P', Q' > and S', between
< P' / Q' > and w' and eventually converge on a
consequence R 1 such that the D/M is indifferent to that and
the lottery < P* , Q' >
R'
Now if R' and R have the same value of X that is
they fall vertically aligned than it appears initially
that X is utility independent of Y. This establishes P, Q,
R and P', Q' , R' have the same relative preference.
As a final check a new amount of Y is chosen - y"
and the procedure is repeated with the lottery
< p"
f
q» > # if the D/M converges upon R" as being
indifferent to the lottery then utility independence of X
to Y is reasonably assured. However, an additional check
could be to test the D/M 1 s indifference to a lottery < P" , R" >
and < P, R > and check to see if the certainly equivalent
has the same amount of X.
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a vector then the conditional utilities are assessed in





If the utility of (x
, y ) is arbitrarily set at 1 and the
utility of (x
, y ) is arbitrarily set at then the complete
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From the three loteries above it's obvious that u(x', y ) = 5
u(x'\ y°) = .75 and u(x ,M
,
y°) = .25.
Assessing the Scaling Constants
The form of the utility function u(x,y) is specified
in terms of a number of conditional utility functions over
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either X or Y and scaling constants. If there are N and M
conditional utility functions for X and Y respectively and
there are R scaling constants,
N m
U)
u(x,y) = f [u 1
x
(x) , . . .u
x
(x) , u^(y) , . . .u
r
)y) , k-^ k 2 ...k ],
where f is specified and all the utility functions can be
scaled from zero to one since the scaling constants are
used to insure internal consistency.
The k*s are evaluated by obtaining an evaluating R
independent equations with R unknowns, which are generated
from certainty considerations, probabilistic considerations
or both. For instance using certainty scaling, if
consequences (x,y) and x
2 ,y 2 ) are indifferent, then by















, u^ (y 2 ) , . . .u^(y 2 ) , k,...k 12]
•N/
.,m
One equation exists with at most R unknowns. The u 's
and u ' s are known since they have already been assessed.
If probabilistic scaling is used then a consequence
must be chosen so that it is indifferent to a lottery with








By equating expected utilities:
u(x
3 ,y 3 )
= pu(x
1 ,y 1 ) +
(1-p) u (y 2 ,y 2 )
and combining with equation (1) an equation is obtained
involving k, , . . . kR as the only unknowns.
Therefore by using either certainty scaling or
probabilistic scaling R independent equations are generated
with the R k ' s as the only unkowns. For example the
quasi-additive utility function:
u(x,y) = k u (x) + k u (y) + k u (x)uv (y)"XX Y"Y 'YX"X X ' Y (2)
has origins for u, u
x , yx :
u(x°, y°) = 0, u
x
(x°) = 0, uY (y°)
=
and a consequence space:
o
. ^ o






(x), yy (y), kx , ky kxy]
where kv , kv , k are the unknown scaling contants.A x AY
If it is assumed that both x and y are increasing
in preference then the utility functions are scaled by
u(x\y') = 1, u
x
(x') = 1, uy (y') = 1
Using these utilities and equation (2) evaluated
at (x 1
,







Evaluating (2) at (x',y ) and (x
,
y' ) respectively yields
the following:
u(x', y ) = ky and u(x , y' ) = ky . (4)
The decision maker must then be asked if he prefers
(x'
, y ) or (x , y' ) . If the former is preferred then from
(4) kv > k and if the latter is preferred then k > kAY Y A
and if they are indifferent then kv = k__. If kv > kvAY Ax
then a consequence may be found such that (x 1
, y ) and
(x
,














To help the decision maker identify y 1 , one might
present him with a specific choice between (x, y ) and
(x
,
y' ) with x fixed. If the first consequence were
preferred to the second, x would be decreased and the
binary choice reoffered and vica-versa. With this approach
one should converge on x'
.
If probabilistic scaling is used then a probability
p must be obtained such that the decision maker is indifferent
between a consequency (x 1
, y ) and the lottery.
[ (x* , y
1








o o.(x ,y )
By using (2) again it follows that k,. = px and together
with (3) , (5) the quantities kx , k and k can be solved,
Consistency Check
Once the utility function of u(x,y) has been
formulated then a consistency check should be performed
to detect errors in the decision maker's utility function
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and determine whether the function represents his true
preferences. This can be accomplished by several methods
which include paired comparisons of various consequences.
With the utility function u(x,y) the D/M is asked whether
he prefers (x .y ) to (x, ,yK ). If (x .y ) is preferreda a. D D a a
then it naturally must have a higher utility value than
(xh/ y,) to be consistent. Obviously this check can be
performed repeatedly, however, it is recommended that the
D/M is posed with easier comparisons to start off.
A second method involves the emprical determination
of whether or not the D/M is risk averse in positive rays
of the form (x, ex) where c > 0. The D/M is asked what
consequence (x,,cx,) is indifferent to (cx 2 ,cxJ; 1/2;
(x,,cxJ ) where (XofCxJ is if x, is less than (x 2 + x^)/2
then the D/M is ray risk averse. For ray risk aversion
for preferences increasing in X and Y u' (x,cx) must be
positive and u"(x,cx) must be negative for all x, where u 1




This section describes the results of the decision
analyses methodology for a "Design to Performance" or a
"Design to Change" type philosophy. The same approach
as Chapter 5 for the Design to Cost philosophy was followed
in this section. However, the results were as expected
somewhat different because the D/M was more interested
in availability rather then cost and was more willing to trade
off the acquisition cost for the increased availability. In
so doing, however, the D/M showed a risk aversion to a ship
with low availability.





1.0 x 10 x 1.05 x 10 - acquisition cost
75% y 95% - availability
2 Utility Independence
Utility independence was again verified from
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(1.05, 95) = - 1
u
2




(1. 0, 75) - - 1.0
b. The results of the following lotteries
described the u, function
(1.0, 95)
1/2.













The condition utility function for u, (x,95)
is plotted in Figure 39.
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c. The results of the following lotteries
















The condition utility function for u 2
(1.0, y) is plotted in Figure 40.
4 . Computing the Scaling Constants
a. The following scale was arbitrarily set
u(1.0, 95) =0.0
u(l. 05, 75) = - 1
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1.0 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05
0.0
-.5
FIGURE 39 Conditional Utility Plot u 1 (x, 95)
95 90 85 80 75
-. 5 •
-1.
FIGURE 40 Conditional Utility Plot u 2 (1.0,y)
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b. In addition the D/M was indifferent
between the following consequences:
(1.05 f 95) ~ (1.0, 85)
however:
(1.05, 95) > (1.0, 75)
c. Define a, and a 2 :
u(1.05, 95) = a
x
u(1.0, 75) = a
2













(1. 05, 95) ~ -a
2
u 2 (1.0, 85)
however from Figure 40, u 2 (1.0,85) = .4








e. The basic utility function as in Chapter 5



















f. The D/M chose the consequence (1.03, 85)








E(u) = 1/2(0) + l/2(-l)
= - 1/2
.*. u(1.03, 85) = - 1/2












(l. 03,95) ) (-a 2 u 2 (1. 0,85)
. 4a-. 2
h.
from Figures 39 and 40.
u^l. 03,95) = - . 5
u
2 (1.0, 85) = - .4









The utility function of u(x,y) turned out
to be:








In order to shift eh scale so that
u(1.0,95) = 1.0 and u(l. 05,75) = 0.0
1.0 was added to the utility function.
u(x,y)=.375u
1







(1. 0,y) + 1.0
The 3-dimensional plane that describes
u(x,y) is plotted in Figure 41.
B. Decision Tree Development
For the normal form of decision tree analysis it
was again assumed that in addition to the high and low level
modular designs, two intermediate levels of design existed.
The acquisition cost for each level was the same and also
the availability was the same for each state of nature as
in Chapter 5, (see Table 2 and 3).
The utilities for each level and for each state of
























FIGURE 41 Utility Plane for Design to Performance
NOTE: All utilities have been scaled up by 1.0 in order
to place the plane in the positive sector.
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The above utilities were substituted into the exact
same tree with the same probabilities for the states of
nature, outcomes, and the conditional probabilities as in
Chapter 5 (Figure 42 ) . it was assumed that little reason
existed to change the probabilities at the various chance
nodes because the philosophy of the design should in no way
have influenced them.
The results of the decision tree should once again
that the optimal strategy was to follow the lower b] anch and
gather additional information. However, this assumed that
this process was cost free to the D/M. Because the optima]
strategy in the upper branch (e.g. design level B) was only
.01 utilities less than that of the lower branch then it an
acquisition cost increase had been imposed on the modular
design in the lower branch to cover the cost of the study,




Again in order to simplify the probability sensitivity
analysis the problem was condensed to .i two state ol nature,
two outcome two act problem. Also the probabili.1 Lea EOJ th<'
above items remained the same. An acquisition cost Lncrease
Df $250,000 was imposed on the lower Level design candidates













FIGURE 42b Lower Decision Tree Branch for "DTP"
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From Figure 42 by averaging out and folding back it
was obvious that the optimal strategy was not to engage in a
study but to build the modular design.
An extensive form of analysis (Table 6 ) was next
conducted utilizing the decision tree in Figure 43. Again
from column 3 and 4 the equations describing each strategy
over the range of probabilities of a ship requiring 1
M & C per lifetime were formulated.
1. .625(P) + .43(1-P) = .43 + .195 P
2. .625(P) + .5(1-P) = .15 + .125 P
3. .612 P + .444(1-P) = .444 + .168 P
4. .614 P + .465 (1-P) = .465 + .149 P
5. .615 P + .429 (1-P) + .429 + .186 P
6. .610 P + .48 (1-P) = .48 + .13 P
Like the sensitivity analysis performed for the DTC
philosophy in Chapter 5 one strategy remained optimal
throughout the entire range of P; that strategy being to
build the high level modular design. However, one point
worth mentioning and that is that at P = 1.0 strategy 1
(to build low level design) is also optimal, (Figure 44).
u(strategy 2 @ P = 1.0) = .625
u(strategy 1 @ P = 1.0) = .625
Although it appears unlikely that this probability will occur
the point is still worth mentioning.
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